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Executive Summary 
In 2007, Florida processed more than 15 million 
911 calls. Virtually all were answered and 
processed without attracting public attention.  
But two calls focused national attention on how 
Florida's 911 system failed and how lives were 
lost. 
In keeping with its mission of improving the 
quality of life in the communities it serves, Gulf 
Coast Community Foundation of Venice 
initiated a study to determine if those calls were 
emblematic of isolated anomalies or of systemic 
flaws. 
It found a system that falls short in fundamental 
aspects of any public service: the ability to 
measure the success of outcomes, the dedication 
of sufficient resources, and the provision of an 
equal level of service to every citizen. 
The findings, in brief: 
1. Florida has no one board, office or person 
with the authority to monitor how 
effectively calls for emergency assistance 
are handled, and has no statewide data to 
assess error rate, response time or any other 
measure of the delivery of service. 
 
2. Florida underfunds its 911 system. Florida's 
911 fees are in the bottom third of all states, 
its fee collections are declining, and it pays 
less than two-thirds of the cost of 911 
service, leaving the rest to cash-strapped 
counties. And state law prohibits spending 
911 funding on dispatch services, seen as an 
integral part, if not the purpose, of a 911 
system. 
 
3. Florida's 911 calls are answered in 258 call 
centers, all with their own standards for 
training, protocol and equipment. Florida 
recommends, but does not mandate, training 
for 911 call takers. As a result, centers do 
not necessarily employ industry best 
practices and standards, and Floridians 
receive uneven levels of service. 
 
4. Florida's 911 system still has a rural-urban 
divide, even though a stated goal of federal 
law establishing modern 911 systems is to 
improve service to rural areas. 
 
5. Florida has yet to establish N11 service, 
which would reduce the instances of 911 
centers being overwhelmed by inappropriate 
calls. 
 
6. Florida's coordination of equipment used for 
emergency response remains incomplete and 
hinders seamless communication throughout 
the state. 
 
7. Florida has made significant progress in 
incorporating new technology into the 911 
system, but other infrastructure 
vulnerabilities have been unaddressed. 
 
In short, the analysis revealed that Florida does 
not have a 911 “system,” but rather a patchwork 
of agencies, protocols and technologies cobbled 
together to respond to 911 calls. To create a 
“seamless end-to-end” emergency response 
system, Florida must overcome the 
fragmentation and establish a coordinated 911 
emergency response system with proper 
oversight and sufficient funding.
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I. Purpose of the Study 
The 911 emergency response system is a 
complex and critical government service. It is 
complex because successful response to each 
emergency 911 call requires coordinated 
activation of multiple human and technological 
elements.  
It is critical because protection of personal 
safety and property is a fundamental expectation 
of government. It is a public good, and the 
federal government has taken steps to mandate 
adequate public safety at the state level. States 
and municipalities commit significant resources 
to fulfilling this mandate. 
In 2008, as the U.S. Senate reviewed Florida 
Senator Bill Nelson's legislation to improve the 
911 system, his colleague Sen. Daniel Inouye 
said he could “think of few government 
initiatives that have been as successful as 911.”1   
911 was established to create one universal 
number that was easy to remember and dial in a 
life-threatening situation. The assumption was 
that 911 saves lives because it saves time; a 
person need not seek the seven-digit number for 
the nearest police, medical or fire rescue 
facility. Inouye's statement illustrates the 
simple, clear expectation the program has 
engendered: Call 911, and help is on the way. 
Yet, in at least two well-publicized instances in 
Florida last year, crime victims were able to call  
                                                 
1 
Senator Inouye made the remarks June 16, 2008, to 
support the “New and Emerging Technologies 911 
Improvement Act of 2008.” 
 
 
911 and reach a 911 call-taker, but help never 
arrived.  
In the first instance, Denise Amber Lee, a 21-
year-old Sarasota County resident and mother of 
two young sons, was able to place a 911 call 
from her abductor’s cell phone while she was a 
prisoner in his car. Another driver who saw Mrs. 
Lee in a car while driving suspected a crime was 
in progress and also called 911. Both calls were 
answered.   
Yet only some of the units that could have been 
dispatched to save Mrs. Lee were actually 
dispatched.  Many officers in units that were in 
the vicinity of where the crime was being 
committed were unaware the crime was in 
progress.  Sarasota County officials notified law 
enforcement in adjacent counties of the crime in 
progress and relayed information regarding the 
suspect’s vehicle. However, there was a 
breakdown in emergency response efforts as the 
suspect traveled into Charlotte County. 
 A call-taker at the Charlotte County office 
received the information, but did not send the 
information to officers in the field. Judging from 
where Mrs. Lee’s remains were found, she 
almost certainly was transported within a few 
hundred feet of law enforcement officers.  Had 
those field officers been aware of her abduction 
or the available description of the suspect’s 
vehicle, they might have been able to stop the 
vehicle and apprehend the suspect before he 
killed Mrs. Lee. 
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In a second incident, Olidia Kerr Day called 911 
to report that she was being pursued by a man 
she believed intended to kill her.  She was trying 
to drive to the Plantation Police Department for 
help, but could not find it and asked the call 
taker for directions.  
The call-taker neither tried to help Day find the 
station nor dispatched units to help her. Day 
found the station by herself, but was shot and 
killed by her pursuer before she could enter the 
building. The incident was partially captured on 
surveillance cameras operating at the police 
station.   
If the measure of a successful 911 call is simply 
the ability to reach a call-taker, then 911 
performed adequately in both cases. So why did 
these incidents end tragically? Are Florida’s 
resources and procedures adequate for 
responding to calls for emergency assistance? If 
they are inadequate, how do we improve them? 
And, first and foremost, how well does the 911 
system serve the 15 million people who attempt 
to use it each year? 
The purpose of this study is to begin to answer 
these questions and to prompt an inclusive 
public discussion of issues critical to 911 
emergency response in Florida. It is by no 
means an exhaustive examination of the system. 
There are limitations to engaging in such an 
undertaking that are discussed herein.  
But answering those questions requires a 
consideration of all the components of 
emergency response that are activated at that 
critical moment when a person needs emergency 
assistance. A single call must pass through a 
network that may involve contact with several 
people, several agencies, and several types of 
equipment.  At each point when the call is 
passed along, the chain can be broken.  This is 
true of all 911 systems, but it is particularly an 
issue in Florida where there is no central 
oversight of all the relays that take place. 
The nature of the fragmentation in areas that 
affect 911 are summarized below in seven key 
findings that represent challenges for 911 
service provision. Each finding is accompanied 
by a recommendation or recommendations that 
may be considered to overcome each challenge. 
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II. Findings and Recommendations 
Finding 1  
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 1a 
Redefine 911 as a comprehensive Emergency 
Response System inclusive of all aspects of 
government emergency service provision from 
the time a caller dials 911 to the time help 
arrives on the scene. 
Recommendation 1b 
Appoint a state-level position to oversee and 
coordinate all aspects of emergency response in 
Florida, from the time a caller attempts to place 
a call to the time assistance arrives at the scene. 
The individual or committee should have the 
authority to: 
• collect comprehensive incident reports 
from call centers; 
• evaluate and approve emergency 
response equipment that will 
interconnect with other equipment used 
in the state; 
• evaluate call center protocol; 
• insure that all emergency response 
personnel have adequate training; 
• establish minimum standards for call 
handling and disciplinary procedures for 
those who make critical errors; 
• evaluate county comprehensive plans to 
determine if local zoning plans are 
consistent with provision of superior 
response to 911 calls. 
Recommendation 1c 
Establish a statewide task force of all 
stakeholders in Florida’s emergency response 
community to study these and other 
recommendations for improving Florida’s 911 
and emergency response system. The task force 
should include representatives from law, 
medical and fire emergency rescue agencies, the 
legislature, telecommunications industry, 
private and community college training 
programs, state departments that facilitate 911 
response and radio systems, and members of the 
public. 
 
Finding 2 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 2a 
Increase the 911 collection from the current 
$0.50 maximum and attach such fees to all 
newer telecommunications devices as provided 
for in Florida statutes. 
Recommendation 2b 
Amend Florida statutes to expand the range of 
expenses that may be covered by the E911 Trust 
Fund to include all aspects of emergency 
response.
Florida has no one board, office or person 
with the authority to monitor how effectively 
calls for emergency assistance are handled, 
and has no statewide data to assess error 
rate, response time or any other measure of 
the delivery of service. 
Florida underfunds its 911 system. Florida's 
911 fees are in the bottom third of all states, 
its fee collections are declining, and it pays 
less than two-thirds of the cost of 911 service, 
leaving the rest to cash-strapped counties. 
And state law prohibits spending 911 funding 
on dispatch services, seen as an integral part, 
if not the purpose, of a 911 system. 
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Finding 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 3a 
Minimum standards for training, protocol and 
equipment should be mandated for all call 
centers such that each has: 
• Appropriately trained and certified 
personnel to answer, process and 
dispatch calls; 
• Protocol for handling calls based upon 
emergency-industry established best 
practices; 
• Call answering, dispatch and field 
communications equipment that is 
compatible within and across all 
emergency service agencies in Florida. 
 
Recommendation 3b 
Explore call center consolidation to reduce the 
number of call centers, and thus reduce 
redundancies, reduce call transfers and increase 
consistency, in equipment and protocol. 
 
Finding 4 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 4a 
Increase funding for the state’s 30 rural counties 
through nonrecurring funding until all rural call 
centers provide services comparable to urban 
ones. 
Recommendation 4b 
Allow counties with underfunded 911 call 
centers to establish Municipal Services Taxing 
Units (MSTU) to provide a recurring source of 
funding for provision of E911 emergency 
response services. 
Recommendation 4c 
Provide grant-writing assistance for rural 
counties. 
Finding 5 
 
 
 
Recommendation 5a 
Insure that N11 services are available 
throughout the state. 
Recommendation 5b 
Formulate statewide public information 
campaigns to help consumers better understand 
911, focusing on appropriate reasons for calling 
911 and suggesting alternative N11 numbers 
available for non-emergencies (311), social 
service referral (211), highway conditions (511) 
and other services.  
Recommendation 5c 
Consider increasing the severity of penalties 
from its current misdemeanor maximum fine of 
$1,000 for placing harassing or fraudulent 911 
calls. 
Florida's 911 calls are answered in 258 call 
centers, all with their own standards for 
training, protocol and equipment. Florida 
recommends, but does not mandate, training 
for 911 call takers. As a result, centers do not 
necessarily employ industry best practices 
and standards, and Floridians receive uneven 
levels of service. 
Florida's 911 system still has a rural-urban 
divide, even though a stated goal of federal 
law establishing modern 911 systems is to 
improve service to rural areas. 
Florida has yet to establish N11 service, 
which would reduce the instances of 911 
centers being overwhelmed by inappropriate 
calls.
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Finding 6 
 
 
 
Recommendation 6a 
Conduct a comprehensive survey of equipment 
available to place 911 calls, receive 911 calls, 
dispatch emergency response and communicate 
with emergency responders in the field to detect 
interconnectivity vulnerabilities. 
Recommendation 6b 
Establish state-level lists of approved equipment 
or standards for interconnectivity among ALL 
types of devices used to access and mobilize 
emergency response. These lists will give public 
safety purchasing authorities options that will 
work seamlessly with other public safety 
entities. 
Recommendation 6c 
Insure that all users of E911 resources, such as 
the Florida Interconnectivity Network, have 
adequate training to do so effectively. 
Finding 7 
 
 
 
Recommendation 7a 
Conduct a comprehensive assessment of the 
state’s wireline infrastructure to determine if it 
is practically sustainable for 911 emergency 
response until newer technology supplants it. 
 
Recommendation 7b:  Continue to encourage 
telecommunications industry representatives to 
upgrade devices to enhance them with the latest 
available technology for locating 911 callers, 
such as GPS. 
 
Each of these recommendations is discussed in 
more detail later in this report. The pages that 
follow break down the process from the time a 
call is placed to the time help arrives at the 
scene.  The overarching assumption is that only 
when the entire process functions to rush aid to 
an individual experiencing an emergency can 
Florida hope to have an emergency response 
system that saves lives. 
A state with 53 million square miles of 
landmass, 18 million residents and 84 million 
visitors cannot afford to have a loosely 
coordinated 911 emergency response system.  
Florida has taken some important steps to 
improve the level of service, but critical gaps 
remain in the system. There are too many points 
throughout the process of Florida’s emergency 
response at which calls can be lost or 
mishandled, and there is no way of knowing 
how often this occurs.
Florida's coordination of equipment used for 
emergency response remains incomplete and 
hinders seamless communication throughout 
the state. 
Florida has made significant progress in 
incorporating new technology into the 911 
system, but other infrastructure vulnerabil-
ities remain unaddressed. 
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III. Methodology 
This study was conducted from September to 
December 2008.  Gulf Coast Community 
Foundation of Venice assembled a team that 
included a member of the Florida Association of 
Public-Safety Communications Officials 
(APCO),2 an administrator of a community 
college training center, a government 
consultant, law enforcement officers and 
citizens.  The Foundation commissioned an 
independent firm, Tartaglione & Associates, to 
conduct, with input from the team, an 
independent and objective analysis of Florida’s 
emergency response 911 system.   
The original objective of the study was to 
determine to what extent Florida’s 67 counties 
employ training standards that are consistent 
with national standards for emergency response 
services, especially in the areas of technology, 
training and policy. 
The study was conceived as a survey design. 
The firm planned to collect self-reported data 
from each of the counties to determine how they 
differed in terms of emergency service 
attributes.  However, that strategy was 
abandoned for two reasons. First, there is no one 
standard to which all agencies involved in 
emergency response services are held.  Federal 
policies make recommendations for the type of 
service states should provide, but creating 
standards for how those services will be 
provided is largely left up to each of the states 
or to the municipalities within them. 
                                                 
2 
The APCO representative withdrew before the study was 
complete. 
 
Furthermore, as already overburdened public 
employees find little discretionary time in their 
schedules, response percentages for the length 
of survey required was anticipated to be low.  
Early overtures to some agencies indicated a 
disinclination to participate in such a study, at 
least in part, due to perceived adverse political 
ramifications. 
Consequently, the firm developed a strategy to 
conduct a situational analysis of Florida’s 911 
emergency response system. Standard practice 
for conducting such an analysis begins with 
identifying the internal features of the system 
and judging which components of the system do 
what they are supposed to do (strengths) and 
which could be improved (weaknesses).   
To determine which external conditions enable 
or inhibit the service’s ability to fulfill its 
mission, the firm also analyzed political, 
economic, social, technological and 
environmental factors. These included pending 
legislation, dominant political ideologies held 
by opinion leaders, the state of the economy, 
public attitudes toward the service and 
availability of emerging technology. 
Environmental factors that enable a system to 
provide its services, in this case, the government 
provision of emergency response, is considered 
a potential opportunity. A factor that limits the 
same is considered a potential threat. 
Data was collected over a four-month period.  
During this time, researchers analyzed 
secondary resources including public records, 
reports on file with the state Department of 
Management Services (such as 911 plans of 
Florida 911 
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each county), academic journal articles, and 
technical and media reports. Many important 
national studies, most notably the 911 Industry 
Alliance’s 2007 study Health of the U.S. 911 
System and the 2003 Hatfield Report, were 
researched for standards that might apply to 
Florida’s emergency services. 
The firm collected information from primary 
sources, as well. It conducted formal and 
informal interviews with public safety experts 
and users, state and local elected officials, state, 
county and city staff, members of public safety 
professional organizations, a Homeland Security 
official assigned to Florida, 911 call takers, and 
911 call center managers. An informal 
roundtable with Alachua County public safety 
officials included personnel, technical and 
facility supervisors of the county’s combined 
communications center and city of Gainesville 
law enforcement officers. The firm also 
conducted a site visit of the Alachua County’s 
Combined Communications Center. A list of 
interviews is included in Appendix A. 
The researchers conducted a case study of 
Alachua County to consider in greater depth the 
factors that affect 911 emergency response. 
Alachua County was chosen for a number of 
reasons.  It is one of only three call centers in 
Florida that has earned call center certification 
for the Commission for Accreditation on Law 
Enforcement Agencies.  CALEA certifies those 
call centers that employ what it identifies as 
“best practices” across a range of activities, such 
as management practices, training and staff 
scheduling.  Equally important was Alachua 
County officials' openness to public inspection.  
Researchers never were denied access to 
requested materials or facilities. 
Unfortunately, the very qualities that make 
Alachua County a good choice for the study also 
limit how far the information collected can be 
generalized.  The combined call center is 
atypical of most counties. Consequently, the 
researchers augmented the study with a review 
of 911 plans from all of Florida’s counties, and 
spoke with officials in some of those counties as 
well. 
The information collected and summarized 
herein describes the 911 emergency response 
system in Florida from call origination to 
agency response on the scene. It describes the 
many factors that come into play at each 
segment of the process in Florida.   
Throughout the process of collecting and 
analyzing data, the researchers held no agenda, 
political or otherwise, for conducting this study.  
The principal investigators all are affiliated with 
academic departments and trained in scientific 
methodology, research design and/or Florida 
government. Their recommendations and 
findings are their own, and do not represent the 
views of any other organization. Task force 
members had no goal other than supporting and 
improving Florida’s 911 emergency response 
system. The sole purpose of the study is to 
describe, as objectively as possible, the 911 
emergency response system in the state of 
Florida.  It is hoped that the study will be 
helpful to anyone seeking to understand the 
complexities of Florida’s 911 system, especially 
those further motivated to assist in maintaining 
or improving it.
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IV. Overview: Florida’s Fragmented System 
Any discussion of the effectiveness of the state's 
emergency response system hinges on one 
crucial fact: Florida's 911 system is not a true 
“system.”   
There is no one authority in the state that 
monitors and coordinates all aspects of 
emergency response from the time a caller 
needs emergency assistance to the time that help 
arrives. And Florida law on the funding of 911 
services severs the call-taking function from the 
inherently linked function of dispatching 
emergency personnel. 
Section V of this analysis will describe the 
internal aspects of the system to explain how the 
system works. This section is focused upon the 
external factors that explain why the system 
evolved the way it did.  
Clearly, Florida did not intend to create a flawed 
system.  The officials interviewed for this study 
were uniformly committed to their life-saving 
mission. So how could their system fail when it 
was most needed? 
To answer this question, one must consider the 
environment in which the system was created—
the political, economic, and technological 
factors that constitute the rules of the game.  
The ability to improve any system is constrained 
by these external factors that shape, to a large 
degree, what the system will look like and how 
effective it will be. 
Florida is considered by many technology 
experts to have a progressive 911 system 
compared with other states.  That perception is 
because newer call answering technology has 
been deployed in most of the state. This 
technology allows an emergency call taker to 
reconnect a disconnected call and to identify the 
geographic location of a caller, even when the 
call is placed from a cellular device. These are 
significant enhancements to the call-taking 
aspect of 911 emergency response. 
However, there is one critical distinction to 
make: The ability of all citizens to call one 
number for emergency service needed does not 
insure the safety of any. Only when the system 
functions to provide the appropriate response to 
a 911 call in a timely and reliable fashion does 
the state enhance the well-being of its citizens. 
Even with the full deployment of the newest 
technology, the entire sequence of events 
triggered by that call must function for the 
caller's safety to be preserved. 
Critical errors with fatal consequences continue 
to expose vulnerabilities within the system.  Part 
of the problem lies within the system itself. The 
911 system began as a federal initiative, passed 
to the states and left largely to the counties to 
implement. It should be no surprise that multiple 
layers of governance result in an emergency 
response system that is far from seamless.  
Each law enforcement agency at the federal, 
state, county and municipal level may, and 
usually does, have its own set of equipment, 
protocol and resources to respond to 911 callers. 
Florida 911 
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A. Fragmentation 
The public perceives 911 as a seamless system 
where a call is answered by an agency that has 
the authority to determine what type of help is 
needed, and to summon fire units, patrol cars or 
other emergency service vehicles.  
There is not a single county in Florida for which 
this holds true.  Though some counties have 
attempted to create a single agency that answers 
calls and summons appropriate responders, all 
have to transfer at least some calls to another 
agency. Any time a call is transferred, it 
introduces the possibility that the call will be 
disconnected or misdirected. 
Florida has 258 call centers, called Public Safety 
Answering Points, or PSAPs, cobbled together 
in a loosely organized fashion. (The United 
States has 6,000 such centers.3 ) Within each of 
Florida’s 67 counties, there usually are multiple 
agencies that answer 911 calls for that county. 
Just 27 counties have only one center that 
directly receives 911 calls from the caller.  The 
remaining 40 have at least two—and as many as 
24—call centers.4  In them, multiple agencies 
                                                 
3 
The exact number of call centers (PSAPs) answering 911 
calls in the United States is difficult to pinpoint. The 
National Emergency Number Association, the FCC and 
CTIA all have cited different numbers. The latter two 
maintain databases of call centers, as well. The numbers 
each cite fall between 6,100 and 7,300. 
 
4 
Palm Beach County has 24 answering centers, plus one 
back up. A full listing of the number of answering 
agencies per county is included in Appendix E. Data from 
the matrix are a compilation of county 911 plans filed 
with the state Department of Management Services, and 
are available at 
may answer calls; call takers also may dispatch 
fire, police or medical services directly, or may 
transfer the call to another agency for dispatch. 
Further, the supervision of the 911 call centers 
in each county falls under more than one 
agency. On paper, the supervisory authority for 
each call center is the Board of County 
Commissioners. The county provides some 
funding for the centers. 
However, the actual operation of each center is 
delegated to another agency or agencies.  Often, 
the county Sheriff’s Department operates the 
call center. However, the 911 administrator, 
who coordinates call center activities, might 
report to another agency and an official other 
than the sheriff. In Alachua County, for 
example, the Sheriff’s Office houses, manages 
and staffs a combined communications center 
for the entire county.  However, the Alachua 
County 911 coordinator is hired and supervised 
by Alachua County Fire Rescue. In rural 
Calhoun County, the 911 administrator's critical 
duties are just some of many that fall to the 
county sheriff.   
Complicating matters is the diversity of the state 
in its geography and population centers.  Seven 
of Florida’s counties are considered large, 30 
midsized and 30 rural.5 The challenges and 
resources available to support 911 services vary 
by size. The equipment, staffing and protocol of 
a large county's call center bears little 
resemblance to that of a small county.
                                                                               
http://dms.myflorida.com/suncom/public_safety/florida_e
911/florida_e911_plan 
5 
As defined by F.S. 165.172 (3) 
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B. State and Local Oversight 
Florida’s 911 emergency communications 
system dates to 1974 and the passage of the 
Florida Emergency Telephone Number Act, F.S. 
365.171. It was substantially overhauled in 
2007, recasting the Wireless 911 Board as the 
E911 Board and centralizing fee collection at 
the state level. 
Structure 
The E911 board is charged with coordinating 
and enhancing the 911 emergency response 
system in Florida. (The “E” stands for 
“enhanced”; a state’s 911 equipment is 
considered “enhanced” if it is capable of 
receiving a caller’s number and location 
information along with the voice transmission.) 
The board consists of nine members. The 
governor directly appoints eight members: four 
representatives from the telecommunications 
industry and four 911 county coordinators. The 
Secretary of the Department of Management 
Services (DMS), who also is appointed by the 
governor, designates a ninth member to serve as 
chair.  A six-person staff provides support 
services.6 
Strengths 
The current structure ensures that two key 
constituencies are represented: the counties, 
which provide emergency response services, 
                                                 
6 
E911 Board and Statewide Coordination Fall 2008 
Presentation, 
http://dms.myflorida.com/media/cits_media/florida_e911
_files/911_coordinators_meeting_and_presentations_fall_
2008/911_coordinators_meeting_and_presentations_fall_
2008 
 
and the telecommunications companies, which 
establish the technology behind the services.  
The board meets monthly and has three main 
functions, all of them in theory essential to 
ensuring effective 911 service: 
• It seeks to enhance the E911 system by 
assessing the system's function and 
features and evaluating new technology 
and possibilities for cost savings. 
• It provides coordination and technical 
support to counties on deploying E911 
systems. 
• Its “primary function” is administration 
of the E911 Trust Fund, which will be 
examined in the next section.7 
 
Florida Statutes further direct DMS to develop 
and maintain the state 911 management plan. 
The plan makes recommendations regarding 
staffing levels for call centers, standards for 
length of calls and soundness of infrastructure, a 
potential strength by establishing practices 
proven to be effective. By statute, each county 
in turn submits its own E911 plan to DMS.8   
(The matrix included in Appendix E 
summarizes the type of information the counties 
submit to DMS.  It includes the number of call 
centers located within the county, the number of 
call taking positions, incoming lines, call 
answering equipment and how calls are relayed 
to other agencies.) 
                                                 
7 2008 E911 Board Annual Report, p. 5 
8 
Both the statewide plan and the individual county plans 
(some more current than others) are available on the 
Department of Management Services website, 
http://dms.myflorida.com/suncom/public_safety. 
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Weaknesses 
The E911 Board has no members that represent 
the many organizations that monitor and 
research emergency response mechanisms, even 
though many have Florida chapters. They 
include the National Emergency Number 
Association (NENA), the Association of Public 
Safety Communication Officials (APCO), the 
National Association of State 911 
Administrators (NASNA) and the National 
Association of Fire Chiefs. Nor is there a seat 
allotted to a private citizen, as there are on many 
state boards. 
While the E911 Board and DMS both promote 
effective staffing, call-handling and 
infrastructure practices, neither has authority to 
mandate those standards. Nor does either 
require state or local agencies to submit reports 
regarding those recommendations.  
There is no set requirement for how often the 
counties must submit updated plans, and more 
than half of those currently available online are 
three or more years old (though that also may be 
because of slow website updates). The state 911 
plan also contains no language to coordinate call 
dispatching efforts across the state. There is no 
one statewide office designated by the 
legislature to oversee the effectiveness of 911 
call centers. 
Statute requires counties to designate a 911 
coordinator but does not set forth the 
responsibilities of the position. Individual 
counties determine who will act as coordinator, 
where the coordinator will be located and what 
responsibilities fall to the coordinator. Some 
coordinators are housed within a call center, and 
some are in another agency.   
The coordinator submits reports to the state 
describing the structure of the county's 911 call 
centers but has no authority to establish uniform 
protocol for answering or responding to calls, 
nor the authority to mandate a certain type of 
equipment when it is purchased to insure 
interconnectivity.   
Legislation passed in 2007 also addressed 
statewide call taker certification and the Denise 
Amber Lee Act suggests 208 hours of training 
for call taker certification. But no law mandates 
any required level of training hours. 
Such training would fit with recommendations 
from groups including the Association of Public 
Safety Communication Officials (APCO), 
which seeks increased professionalization of the 
state’s call taking function. Groups suggest 
mandatory certification, enhanced retirement 
benefits and improved pay for call takers as 
ways the legislature could improve the system, 
but counties will resist any change that amounts 
to unfunded mandates from the state.
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Table 1 - Selected State Agencies Involved in Emergency Response 
Agency Emergency Response Activity Statute Reports To 
 
Division of State Fire 
Marshal 
- Certifies Fire Fighters 
- Collects Fire Incident Data 
F.S. 633 Chief Financial Officer 
    
Department of 
Management Services, 
Public Safety Division 
- Collects County 911 Plans 
- Compiles Florida E911 Plan 
F.S. 365 Secretary, Dept. of 
Management Services 
    
Dept. of Management 
Services, 
Telecommunications 
- Addresses Statewide 
  Interoperability for Radios 
F.S. 401 
F.S. 282 
Secretary, Dept. of 
Management Services 
    
Department of Health - Drafted 911 Call Taker 
  Certification Standards 
- Regulates Health Care Related 
  Professions 
F.S. 456 Secretary, Dept. of Health 
    
E911 Board  - Approves E911 Trust Fund 
   Expenditures 
F.S. 365 Governor 
    
Div. of Emergency 
Management 
- Coordinates Disaster Response 
- Certifies Law Enforcement 
  Agencies 
F.S. 252 Governor 
    
Fla. Dept. of Law 
Enforcement 
 - Establishes Standards for 
   Criminal Justice Officer 
   Training 
F.S. 493 Governor and Cabinet 
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C. Funding Mechanism Disallows Spending on Vital Services 
Structure 
In 1999, Florida began appending a fee to each 
telecommunications customer’s bill to cover 
costs related to 911.9  Subsequent legislation 
extended the fee to cellular subscribers who had 
monthly service. 
Companies that provide a dial tone to customers 
within a county collect a fee each month for 
E911 service provision. For wireline service, 
counties set the per-customer fee and may 
collect up to 50 cents per service number per 
month. Sixty-three of 67 counties collect the 
maximum allowable 50-cent fee.10 
For wireless, or cellular, service, Florida statute 
levies a uniform 50-cent fee per service number 
per month. Florida collects no fee from prepaid 
or “pay as you go” wireless users, though it 
completed a feasibility study on such 
collections. The E911 Board has postponed 
implementation until July 2010. 
The 2007 legislative overhaul of E911 statutes 
resulted in all 911 fees being paid to the state. 
(Formerly, counties collected the wireline fee.) 
Collections go into the E911 Trust Fund, which 
reimburses counties and service providers for 
approved expenses. 
                                                 
9 
If a single customer pays for more than 25 connections, 
the fee is appended only to the first 25. 
 
10 
Pasco will soon raise its rate to 50 cents, from 40 cents. 
The other three counties that collect less than 50 cents are 
Duval (44 cents), Lee (44 cents), and Volusia (41 cents). 
 
  
Fee Collected per Wireline 
(maximum under state law): 
 
$0.50
 
Fee Collected per Wireless 
Subscriber: 
 
$0.50
 
Fee Collected from “Pay as 
you go” Subscriber 
 
$0.00
 
Total funding collected for 
911 in 2008: 
From wireless 
From nonwireless 
 
$130,962,053 
$77,451,429 
$53,510,624
 
Money approved for 
counties: 
 
$176,724,437*
  
Number of counties that 
collect maximum 50-cent 
fee: 
 
 
63** of 67
* Includes grants and funds from draw-down of fund 
balance. 
** Pasco will soon raise its rate to the 50-cent 
maximum.
Florida 911 
Page 17 of 68 
 
With traditional wireline service, 97 percent of 
the collected fees are returned to the counties 
under a formula that accounts for each county's 
fee level. The state retains two percent to set 
aside in a fund for rural county grants and 
retains one percent to fund E911 Board 
expenses. 
With wireless cellular service, 67 percent of the 
fee collections are returned to the counties for 
their expenses. The state sets aside 30 percent of 
collections to reimburse wireless companies for 
certified expenses they incur when upgrading 
equipment for E911 use. Two percent of these 
funds go to rural grants and 1 percent funds 
E911 board costs. 
Strengths 
 
Florida's funding system is equitable, in that 
counties are reimbursed in proportion to the 
level of wireline fees the counties are willing to 
impose. The uniform 50-cent user fee for 
cellular service is equitable by definition. The 
feasibility study on collecting E911 fees on 
prepaid cellular phones promises some 
supplemental revenue. 
Florida statutes establishing the E911 Trust 
Fund reserve it solely for funding emergency 
call-taking functions, protecting it in theory 
from being depleted for other uses. And Florida 
law allows other funding mechanisms, such as a 
Municipal Service Benefit Unit. 
Weaknesses 
 
1. Potential shortfalls 
 
Florida's E911 system is underfunded even for 
the purpose of supporting the call-taking 
function, and that is without any support for the 
inextricably linked dispatch system.  
In 2007-2008, total wireless and wireline fee 
collections were almost $131 million. Total 
disbursements to counties were about $103 
million, while their expenses were $170.2 
million, or just 61 percent of costs.11  
The E911 Board expects revenue to remain flat 
in future years but the gap between revenue and 
expenses to keep increasing.12 With just 1.8 
million prepaid cell phone users in Florida, 
collections from those service numbers will not 
close the gap unless the fees are far higher than 
those on other phones, raising issues of both 
equity and resistance from service providers. 
That means call centers will have to 
increasingly rely upon other funding sources to 
cover their expenses, a difficult provision for 
counties seeing sharp declines in their primary 
revenue source, property tax. 
2. Restricted uses 
 
Moreover, those funds cannot be spent on 
anything that is not specifically enumerated in 
the Florida Emergency Telephone Number Act.   
Essentially, the only covered expenses are those 
that attempt to support or improve mechanisms 
allowing a call center to receive 911 calls, with 
                                                 
11 E911 Board 2008 Annual Report, p. 17. Note that in 
the 911 Coordinators Spring 2009 meeting, board cites 
a different figure, 66 percent of costs, but appears to 
be using a different time frame. 
12 E911 Board 2008 Annual Report, Appendix 3, Exhibit 
1. 
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the caller’s location information, from a 
communications device (telephone, cellular 
phone, etc.). That includes, for example call 
answering equipment,  cellular tower 
modifications, caller identification database 
management and training limited to call taking. 
Any expense incurred after a 911 call is 
transferred to the appropriate agency for 
response is specifically prohibited by the Act.  
The cost of radio equipment used to summon a 
fire station to dispatch a fire truck, for example, 
may not be paid with these funds. Funds for 
training not directly related to call taking, 
equipment for dispatch and any other expenses 
must come from the counties, through tax 
revenue or other sources. 
In summary, E911 funding covers only half 
the elements that come into play when an 
emergency call is initiated: call placing and 
intake. The funds may be used for most items 
required to receive a 911 call from a caller, 
but may not be used for summoning or 
providing the assistance requested. 
Appendix C lists the expenses that may qualify 
for reimbursement through E911 funds. 
Strengths Weaknesses 
• Funds collected to cover 911 
service in all 67 counties 
 
• Fees collected from both 
wireline and wireless 
subscribers 
 
• Recent feasibility study 
regarding collecting fees from 
“pay as you go” cellular phone 
users may help the state 
supplement E911 Trust  
 
 
• Funds cover only intake function; 
cannot be used for dispatch 
 
• Funds collected depend upon 
number of subscribers in area 
(weakness for rural counties) 
 
• Wireline collections declining 
 
• Wireless collections flattening 
 
• Maximum collection capped at 
$0.50 
 
• Fees not yet collected from “pay 
as you go” cellular phone users. 
• Potential for counties to raise 
funds through enacting a 
Municipal Service Benefit Unit 
 
• Counties' taxing ability capped at 
10 mills 
• Funds collected may only be 
used for E911 expenses 
• Other states raiding E911 Trusts to 
cover general revenue shortfalls 
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V. Analysis of the System’s Components 
  
Narrowly defined, the 911 system is simply the 
concept that a caller can dial a short, memorable 
series of numerals, 9-1-1, to access emergency 
services, no matter what the emergency. Many 
credible studies of 911 analyze only the system 
components actively involved in providing 
establishing and maintain a 911 calling number. 
For the purposes of this study, the 911 system is 
defined more broadly. It includes each point of 
the process from when a person calls 911 until 
emergency personnel arrive at the scene.  
Clearly, the ability to call a number and have 
someone answer is a crucial component in 
saving lives, but the answering of the call alone 
rarely provides the needed assistance. 
Therefore, this study describes not only how the 
state facilitates 911 call taking, but how it 
facilitates response to that call.   
However, it is important to note that not every 
stakeholder in the system views the 911 system 
as broadly.  Some view the “911 system” as 
encompassing only those elements that are 
engaged from the moment a caller dials 911 to 
the time that call is answered. 
As noted in the previous sections, the difference 
in perspectives matters in Florida, because it 
affects, for example, which components of the 
system are supported from dedicated funds.  In 
Florida, as noted, the E911 Trust funds can only 
be used to support the narrowest definition of a 
911 system: that which starts at the caller and 
ends when the call is answered.   
Funding for the many components of successful 
public safety response apparatus that are 
engaged after the call is received are not 
considered part of the 911 emergency response 
system for purposes of trust fund disbursements. 
This should be a concern for anyone seeking to 
improve emergency response in Florida. 
Stories of flaws in the system that have 
impacted the lives of individuals seeking 
assistance sometimes cite errors that occurred in 
emergency response functions outside what 
others consider 911.  For instance, if a police 
officer is sent to the wrong address, the error 
may have occurred during the dispatching 
function, not the call taking function.   
Figure 3 illustrates the 911 emergency response 
sequence from end to end,  from caller to 
emergency responder.  It lays out a map by 
which one might begin to understand which 
parts of the system are most vulnerable and 
most readily bolstered.   
The extent to which the system is fragmented, 
leaving multiple points of vulnerability to error, 
becomes plainly evident when each component 
in the chain from caller to first responder at the 
scene is specified. 
The nine segments identified in the 911 
Emergency Response sequence represent nine 
key elements included, for the purposes of this 
report, in an “end-to-end” 911 system.  Each of 
the elements must be functional, at least at a 
minimal level, if help is to reach the caller.  If 
eight elements work well and just one fails, the 
whole sequence is interrupted, and the caller 
will either not receive a rapid response or not 
receive a response at all.
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The nine elements are: 
 
1.  The Caller 
The system must function to allow any person, 
of any ability and in any location, to access the 
system during an emergency. If a caller cannot 
access the system at all, the system fails. 
 
2.  The Telecommunications Device 
The system must be accessible from any  
telecommunications device. If a consumer can 
access the system, but calls 9-1-1 from a device 
that is not integrated into the system, the system 
fails. 
 
3.  The Connection 
The system must contain networks of reliable 
wireline and wireless connections to carry the 
call for help.  If the telecommunication device 
works, but its signal travels over a connection 
that is not capable of carrying the call, the 
system fails. 
4.  The Routing 
The system must be correctly networked, so that 
a 911 call is sent to the closest agency with 
jurisdiction to assist the caller.  If the 
connections over which the call travels works, 
but the call is sent to the wrong call center and 
is critically delayed or lost in transfer to the 
correct one, the system fails. 
5.  The Public Safety Answering Point 
(PSAP) 
The system must include call centers that are 
capable of receiving all available information 
for every call.  If a signal reaches the 
appropriate call center, but PSAP is not capable 
of receiving a signal with correct information, 
the system fails. 
6.  The Call Taker 
The system must be populated with call takers 
who are capable of taking the appropriate action 
once the call is received.  If PSAP receives the 
call, but the call taker fails to process the call 
appropriately, the system fails. 
7.  The Dispatcher 
The system also must be populated with 
dispatchers who are capable of determining 
which agencies or units should be sent to assist 
the caller.  If the call taker correctly sends the 
call to a dispatcher, but the dispatcher fails to 
send the appropriate emergency response units, 
the system fails. 
8.  The Agencies and Units 
The system must be capable of notifying the 
first responders who will assist the caller. If the 
dispatcher attempts to summon a rescue agency 
or unit, but cannot do so because of 
interoperability or other logistical issues, the 
system fails. 
9. The Path to the Scene 
The system must provide avenues for rapid 
travel to the scene. If a unit is summoned to a 
scene, but cannot arrive in time to assist the 
caller due to impediments in its path, the system 
fails. 
 
 
This section will break down the 911 emergency 
response sequence into its various segments. 
Each segment, whether it is a human, structural 
or technical element, brings with it a distinct set 
of strengths and weaknesses. 
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FIGURE 3: The 911 Emergency Response Sequence Model 
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1. THE CALLER: Location and Attributes Affect Access 
 
The individual attributes of the caller are the 
most important factors that determine 
emergency response. A caller must have access 
to working service and equipment that allow 
him to call 911, no matter where he lives or 
what his abilities are.  Each of the nearly 15 
million calls placed in Florida were placed by 
individuals with a unique set of abilities and 
circumstances. Many can affect how the caller 
receives services. 
 
The creation of a universal emergency number 
is a strength in providing services across the 
spectrum of caller abilities and provides a 
lifeline to connect those in rural areas.  Having 
911 service available in most of the state is a 
strength. However, there remains an urban-rural 
divide in the level of service available. 
Especially as Florida’s growth shifts  
populations in rural areas, the inequities are a 
special concern. 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
- Access for Urban 
  Callers 
- Access for Rural 
  Callers 
-Disability Equipment 
for Urban Callers 
- Lack of Disability 
  Equipment for Rural 
  Callers 
- Florida Population 
  Concentrated 
- Populations Shifting 
 
Number of Floridians:   18,804,739 
Number of Tourists in 
 Florida, 2007:  84,500,000 
Number of Large Counties:  7 
Number of Mid-Sized Counties:  30 
Number of Rural Counties:   30 
Number of 911 lines with TDD:  1,213 
A. Geography 
Some of the greatest inequalities in the system 
nationally and in Florida may be attributed to 
the location of the caller. A caller should be able 
to access service dialing 9-1-1 from anywhere in 
the country, and overall, coverage in the United 
States is fairly impressive.  However, the 
availability of service and the type of service 
varies across Florida, primarily by size of 
county from which the call is placed.   
 
For classification and funding purposes, the 
state segments counties by population into three 
tiers.  Seven counties are considered large, 
having populations greater than 750,000.  Just 
over 50 percent of Florida’s population lives in 
these seven counties.  Another 45 percent lives 
in the 30 mid-sized counties of 75,000 to 
750,000.  The remaining 30 rural counties have 
less than 5 percent of the population.  Calls 
originating in rural areas are, in many cases, 
treated differently from calls originating in 
urban ones. 
 
The resources available to the caller who seeks 
assistance in Liberty County, with only 9 people 
per square mile, are very different from the 
resources that would be available to the caller 
from Miami-Dade County, with 1,261 people 
per square mile. One might reason that there 
would be less need for emergency law 
enforcement in rural Liberty County than in 
Miami Dade.  That is indeed the case.  In 
Liberty County there are 617 crimes committed 
for every 100,000 in population.  In Miami-
Florida 911 
Page 24 of 68 
 
Dade, the number is almost 10 times that, at 
5,964.16 
However, any given 911 caller in Liberty 
County, at any given time of day, will have only 
one call taker to answer that call. There are a 
total of four lines coming into the center, but 
only one position designated as the call taker for 
any given time.  Furthermore, depending upon 
where one lives in Liberty County, one’s 911 
call might be answered by a call taker in nearby 
Franklin County, because that call center might 
be closer. Should that occur, the call center in 
Franklin County would have to transfer the call 
back to Liberty County, because it lacks the 
authority to dispatch units across county lines.  
If service to the four Liberty County call center 
911 lines is interrupted due to some natural 
disaster, like a hurricane or tornado, there is no 
backup call center. If a Liberty County resident 
has hearing difficulties, there may be limited 
equipment available to assist the hearing 
impaired.17 
 
Conversely, Miami-Dade residents have at their 
disposal six primary call centers, two secondary 
centers and three backups.  More than 120 call 
takers are available throughout the county to 
answer calls coming in from 89 lines dedicated 
                                                 
16 
Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 2006. 
 
17 
Liberty County’s 911 plan on file with the Department of 
Management Services indicates that it does not have TDD 
equipment.  However, Liberty County Coordinator 
Stephen Ford confirmed that the county is capable of 
receiving calls from specialized equipment.. 
 
to calls from outside callers and 57 dedicated 
transfer lines. The state has no data on calls per 
line or call-taker. 
 
Callers who live in counties with large 
populations have other advantages relative to 
those in rural areas.  Poverty levels tend to be 
higher in rural counties, and therefore, the 
ability to afford a telephone is a greater 
challenge.  However, policies that mandate the 
911 access even on devices with no active 
service partially overcome this challenge.  
If a caller has a handset in the residence that is 
connected to a wireline, he may call 911 at no 
cost.  Similarly, cellular telephones with no 
service remain capable of connecting a 911 call.  
Accordingly, many nonprofits stage drives to 
collect and distribute no-service cell phones to 
improve access among those with low incomes.  
Still, some still live in very rural areas, where 
the infrastructure is inadequate due to a lack of 
either a wireline connection from local service 
provider to residence or a nearby cellular tower. 
 
Since only five percent of Floridians live in 
small counties, the urban-rural divide may seem 
to be a less critical area of concern for Florida’s 
911 emergency response system.  However, two 
issues should be considered. First, rural 
residents should expect the same level of service 
as urban residents.  But rural residents are more 
vulnerable in emergency medical situations, 
simply because it takes longer to transport a 
critically ill patient to a facility.  
 
The National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration notes that treatment success 
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rates for critically ill or wounded patients 
depend to a great degree upon how long it takes 
emergency medical personnel to reach them.  
Treatment administered during the “golden 
hour,” the hour immediately following a trauma 
is the most successful.  NHTSA found that a 
much higher percentage of rural residents who 
are critically injured arrive at the hospital after 
the “golden hour” has passed.18  Therefore, 
accessing assistance is even more critical for 
rural residents who have to contend with longer 
transportation times. 
 
Though state funding exists to target this urban-
rural divide, the discrepancies are likely to 
remain. Part of the reason the inequity exists lies 
within the 911 funding structure. The system 
returns to the county an amount proportionate to 
what it contributed.  Because the rural county 
has fewer users, it receives a smaller E911 Trust 
Fund allocations, even though its basic 
infrastructure costs can be similar to those of a 
larger county.   
 
In rural counties, E911 fee disbursement covers 
29 percent of 911 system costs, compared with 
60 percent in mid-sized counties and 67 percent 
in large counties. The E911 Board's rural grant 
program brought that up to a more level 62 
percent of costs, but those grants went to just 25 
                                                 
18 
NHTSA (2005).  Those who are critically injured but 
treated within the first hour following the injury have a 
much higher likelihood of survival. NHTSA found that 30 
percent of those injured in rural accidents arrived after the 
“golden hour” had elapsed, compared with only 8.3 
percent of urban residents. 
 
of the 30 rural counties, meaning some were left 
with major shortfalls.19 
 
Rural counties have a harder time filling the 
gap. By their nature, rural counties collect fewer 
tax dollars because there is no critical mass of 
homeowners or businesses to pay property 
taxes. Therefore, all county-provided emergency 
services—fire, police and medical—must be 
funded from meager resources. 
 
Increased attention to rural counties from the 
state will be necessary to better standardize 
provision of services.  Rural counties will need 
additional funding and support from those with 
technical expertise. Some funds are available to 
augment budgets of call centers located in rural 
counties; however, to access these funds, the 
county would have to have personnel who are 
aware of the grant opportunities and capable of 
filing the necessary justifications for obtaining 
the funds. The state may have to provide this 
expertise until the rural counties are improved.   
 
The state also should allow rural counties to 
raise funds from other sources like Municipal 
Service Taxing Units (MSTUs) that may be 
designated for a specific purpose, like funding 
911 expenses. 
 
It also should be noted that population estimates 
alone do not represent all who might need 
service at a given time.  Though there are 18 
million residents in Florida, millions more at 
any given time are visiting the state. Last year 
                                                 
19 E911 Board 2008 Annual Report, Appendix 2. 
Florida 911 
Page 26 of 68 
 
Florida hosted more than 84.5 million tourists. 
Every day, thousands of tourists drive through 
rural areas of the state. They, too, must have 
access to 911.  It is clearly in the state’s best 
interests to insure that tourists are protected 
wherever they may be in their journey through 
the state. 
 
B. Physical Capabilities 
Some callers must overcome physical barriers to 
access the 911 system.  If a caller has a physical 
disability, that attribute may affect the level of 
service he receives. Those with hearing 
impediments have been identified as especially 
vulnerable in emergency situations. 
 
The state plan calls for all call centers to be 
equipped, for example, with devices that make 
access for hearing impaired individuals possible.  
Most centers are equipped with the 
Telecommunications Device for the Deaf 
(TDD) to assist callers who are deaf or hard of 
hearing, but the use of technology lags behind 
its availability.20 
 
A caller with intellectual disabilities also may 
have a varying range of options when 
approaching the 911 system, yet the system 
must operate for the benefit of all.21 Systems 
                                                 
20 
Harkins, J., Strauss, K. et al, (2008 Spring) Assistive 
Technology, Vol. 20, Is. 1 PP 13-25. 
21 
Bryen, D., Carey, A., et al. (2007 Feb) Cell phone use by 
adults with intellectual disabilities. Intellectual and 
Developmental Disabilities.  Vol. 45, Is. 1, pp 1-9. 
must be capable of receiving information for 
individuals of all intellectual and physical 
capabilities.
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2. THE COMMUNICATIONS INTERFACE DEVICE: 
    Landline, Cellular, Internet Devices Offer Differing Levels of Access 
 
The next element of the system involved in a 
call for emergency assistance is the 
communications device. It makes a difference 
whether a 911 call is placed from a wireline-
connected telephone, a payphone, a cellular 
phone or a device that allows voice to travel 
over the internet. Calls placed from the various 
devices travel over different paths that require a 
variety of technological activation.  The 
company providing a dial tone and the type of 
path the call travels are relevant features of this 
segment. 
 
Possible connections: 
• Telephone over wireline  
• Payphone over wireline 
• Alarm device over wireline 
• Cellular device (contracted service) over 
radio waves 
• Cellular device (“pay as you go”) over 
radio waves 
• Cellular device (no service) over radio 
waves 
• Voice Over Internet (VoIP) 
• Telemetrics device (automatic crash 
notification) over satellite 
 
When the 911 system first connected caller to 
the call taker, traditional telephones, usually 
located in the caller’s home and physically 
connected by wireline to the call-receiving 
agency, were the predominant communications 
interface.  Now the choices are many.  
Along with traditional wireline telephones, a 
person in an emergency situation may also 
access 911 directly through a cellular telephone, 
a Telecommunications Device for the Deaf 
(TDD), an internet-connected device, or 
indirectly through an alarm system or device 
that automatically summons assistance from a 
car when it detects impact. 
The portability of the newer devices introduced 
new opportunities for public safety.  The 
potential for more rapid response existed 
because a caller could call directly from the 
scene, for example. However, the same 
portability creates challenges for locating 
callers.
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A. Traditional Telephones  
The advantages of the traditional telephone are 
that it is frequently available, low cost and easy 
to use.  Another advantage of the traditional 
phone line is that it gives emergency responders 
a known and fixed location to which to respond.  
 
One weakness of the traditional telephone is a 
perceived obsolescence.  The number of 
emergency calls placed from traditional 
telephones via a local exchange carrier on 
company-provided lines varies across Florida, 
but is declining nationwide. That in itself is not 
a weakness, but it creates an assumption that 
wirelines need not be repaired and maintained. 
This possibility will be discussed in a 
subsequent section. 
 
A second weakness is the analog phone's data 
limitations compared with cell phones. While a 
wireline is a reliable carrier of critical 
information, such as the caller’s telephone 
number and location, traditional telephones 
carry only voice and tones.  Newer devices give 
the caller the ability to send text messages if he 
cannot speak, and pictures or video.  That could 
enhance the 911 call taker’s ability to correctly 
assess the nature and severity of the emergency 
so that the appropriate assistance can be 
dispatched to the scene. 
 
 
 
 
B. Cellular Devices 
Cellular telephones are increasingly used to 
access 911.  In as many as 15 percent of homes, 
cellular phones are the only devices used.22  
They also allow callers to contact  911 while 
away from home and without finding a 
payphone.  
 
The technology also may be considered a 
strength for emergency response in Florida. Call 
takers connected to the scene of an emergency 
through the caller’s cellular device may be able 
to more accurately assess what type of 
assistance to dispatch.  Cellular devices also are 
capable of transmitting images to assist call 
takers, although call centers will have to be 
upgraded to receive this information. 
 
The proliferation of cellular devices has greatly 
enhanced a caller’s options for calling for help 
quickly, but, as one telecommunications expert 
pointed out, the availability of cellular phones 
also has the potential to overwhelm the system 
at times.23
                                                 
22 
Wireless Substitution: Early Release of Estimates from 
the National Health Interview Survey, July-December 
2007, National Center for Health Statistics, May 14, 2008, 
YE 2007 Data. 
 
23 
Discussion with Randy Kerr, technical communications 
consultant, 12/08. 
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Strengths Weaknesses 
- Wireline handsets numerous and affordable - Fewer households have them 
-Cell phones provide access in car or outside, 
and can give call takers information from the 
scene 
- Location of moving cellular phones difficult 
to track 
- Free “No Service Initialized” cellular phones 
expand access to low income callers 
- Harassing calls from “No Service Initialized” 
cellular phones clog lines and cannot be tracked 
or blocked 
- VoIP phones expand options for accessing 
911 to include internet 
- VoIP phones not fully enhanced to give call-
back number and location information to 911 
call center 
 
Consider the case of a stranded motorist on an 
interstate.  Before wireless technology was 
widely available, usually the driver or a passing 
Samaritan would have to travel to the next exit 
and find a coin-operated telephone to summon 
help. (Some states had roadside phones pre-
selected to a first responder unit set at varying 
points on interstate highways; citizens' band 
radio also was an option.) 
  
 Today, the driver can call from his car, 
allowing help to arrive more quickly. However, 
it also means that any number of passing 
motorists, attempting to assist the stalled 
traveler, also may call 911 to report it.  Call 
center coordinators report that when there is an 
accident on an interstate highway, calls from 
motorists can easily overwhelm a 911 system.  
In some cases, the closest call taking center has 
only one incoming line. That can prevent callers 
in greater need of assistance from getting 
through. 
 
Cell phones and other wireless devices have 
other weaknesses.  Until relatively recently, cell 
phones were not transmitting the caller’s 
number and location information to the 911 call 
center.  The critical nature of that information 
will be further discussed in the next section, but 
it is worth noting here that the newer 
technology-based communications interface 
devices are not at the same level of compliance 
for reporting critical information to call takers 
as are traditional landline carriers. 
 
Furthermore, the newness of the technology 
may slow use by those unfamiliar with that 
technology.  Dialing 911 on a virtually extinct 
rotary phone or on a push button phone is a 
simple procedure for most.  However, even for 
more sophisticated users, unfamiliar wireless 
devices are a challenge.  For those most 
vulnerable in the population—the poor, the 
elderly and very young children—wireless 
interface devices are often an enigma.  Again, 
this raises an issue of equality-of-access to 
public safety services.
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C. No-Service Initialized (NSI) Phones 
 
 As noted earlier, the activation of cell phones 
with no paid service to call 911 has expanded 
access to those who cannot afford a 
communications interface device. So long as a 
cell phone tower is within range, the caller will 
have access through the cellular device.  
However, the ability of a call taker to identify 
the location from which the call is placed 
depends on whether the device has an associated 
physical location in a telephone service 
database.  For wireline or contract cellular 
service users, the billing address is available in a 
database accessible by the 911 call center.  
 
Because an NSI phone carries no service, there 
is no name or physical location of a subscriber 
in a database to identify the caller. That allows 
NSI phones to be used for placing what 911 
administrators consider harassing calls, 
including bogus calls for help, threatening calls, 
hang ups, accidental calls, and children playing.  
 
In 2006, the National Association of State 911 
Administrators (NASNA) conducted a survey 
on NSI calls. It found that out of 8,400 calls 
from NSI phones to call centers in 12, counties, 
more than 96 percent of these were fraudulent.24  
The association is seeking a policy change that 
would allow centers to block some of these 
                                                 
24 
NASNA (2007). Petition of Inquiry Regarding 911 call-
forwarding requirements and carriers’ Blocking Options 
for Non-Initialized Phones. Cc Docket No. 94-102, 
www.nasna911.org/docs/petition_non_initialized_devices.
pdf. 
 
calls.25  These would include callers who call 
and hang up without speaking, or otherwise call 
with the intention of disrupting call center 
activities. 
 
In Florida, in 2008 alone, there were media 
reports of 911 calls that were placed to complain 
about missing chicken nuggets, poorly made 
hamburgers, or a clerk’s refusal to sell beer.26  
When calls such as these are placed from 
activated cellular or wireline devices, 911 call 
centers can trace the call and pursue appropriate 
action against the caller.  However, since NSI 
numbers are not attached to a specific data base, 
and may not be equipped with GPS, the caller is 
sometimes impossible to find.
                                                 
25 
Discussion with Randy Kerr. 
 
26 
See, for example, “Man Arrested for Drunken 911 Call”  
http://www.wkrg.com/crime/article 
/man_arrested_for_drunken_911_call/23424/. 
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D. Internet-based Devices 
 
The newest interface device being incorporated 
into the 911 system is the Internet-based device, 
such as a VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) 
device.  These devices carry the 911 signal over 
some combination of lines, which may include 
“hardwired” connections, like telephone lines 
and coaxial cable, but also include Wi-Fi 
“clouds” of service provided by routers 
positioned to allow any capable device in a 
specified area to connect. Many of those in the 
industry push for more immediate deployment 
of internet-capable devices, as these may help 
standardize communications over one platform. 
 
Currently, these interface devices have two 
critical and often underreported flaws from a 
911 service provision perspective. First, the 
devices have not been fully integrated into the 
911 emergency response system in that call 
takers are not yet able to fully identify the call-
back number or location of VoIP callers, in 
some areas. 
 
Second, there is the possibility that help will be 
dispatched for a VoIP caller hundreds of miles 
away from the location of the true emergency.  
The call will be routed not to the call center 
closest to the caller, but to the call center closest 
to the address registered with the phone upon 
activating the phone. In a recent case, an Illinois 
call center received a 911 call from a woman 
who felt her life was in danger. The call was 
routed to Illinois because it was her home 
address. She was in Korea.27 
The caller’s location also may be unavailable 
because the caller may “hide” the device’s 
location. VoIP users may route calls through 
locations that exist specifically to “mask” the 
caller’s location, a technique used by prank 
callers. Funds likely will have to be allotted to 
help call centers purchase equipment (estimated 
at $5,000 per unit) to help identify the true 
origins of these calls.
                                                 
27 
Jackson, William (03 March 2009) Council formed to 
improve access to emergency phone services. Government 
Computer News. 
http://gcn.com/Articles/2009/03/03/NESIC-
formed.aspx?Page=3. 
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E. Next Generation 911 
Recently, federal policies and public safety 
sector experts have been addressing problems in 
emergency response that emerged from the 
Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York 
City and Virginia.28  Those attacks exposed 
critical vulnerabilities of the system when first 
responders from one agency were unable to 
communicate with those from another. 
 
Subsequently, more attention has been focused 
on the issue of interconnectivity of first 
responder communication devices.29  Ironically, 
by Florida's 911 statute, equipment upgrades for 
first responders are not eligible for spending via 
the E911 Trust Fund.  
 
Many in the public safety sector are focusing 
efforts on upgrading the nation’s emergency 
response to the “Next Generation 911” (NG911) 
technology.  The NG911 technology does not 
address the first half of the 911 system, from 
caller to call taker, but is capable of resolving 
some of the issues that suppress the 911 
system’s response potential.   
 
NG911 technology will use wireless Internet 
routers to connect every element of the system. 
                                                 
28 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States. The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004. 
 
29 
See, for example, Peha, Jon (March 2005). Protecting 
Public Safety with Better Communications System. IEEE 
Communications Magazine. 
 
The routers will deploy a communication 
“cloud” over a geographic area that will allow 
all enabled communications devices used by 
law, fire and medical first responders to access 
it simultaneously.  Technical experts at Alcatel-
Lucent and Bell Labs recently published their 
vision of such a system they call 911-NOW. 
Their diagram of how mobile wireless 
communications networks might be integrated 
into emergency response is replicated in 
Figure 4.
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FIGURE 4: The 911 Network on Wheels (911-NOW) 
Graphic appeared Abusch-Magder, D, Bosch, P et al., 911 Now: A Network on Wheels for Emergency Response and 
Disaster Recovery Operations published in Bell Labs Technical Journal 11(4), 113-133 (2007). 
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The use of this technology creates numerous 
possibilities. It may resolve interoperability 
problems to some extent.30  Some have 
proposed a “rolling” communications center, 
mobile units carrying the latest technology and 
routers, which would be capable of deploying a 
wireless network to any scene.31 Though this is 
envisioned as a response to mass emergencies, 
there also are applications for local search and 
rescue. 
 
Use of NG911 technology also enhances a 
receiver’s ability to capture any data that might 
be available for transmission. Centers upgraded 
with NG911 technology will be able to receive 
text and even streaming video from the scene of 
an emergency. 
 
One weakness of the new technology is its 
expense. Pursuing deployment of NG911 may 
draw funding away from other critical needs yet 
to be addressed, such as training.  Nonetheless, 
some balance likely must be struck.  As 
consumers have more options for making calls 
and sending data, they may expect that 
emergency call centers are capable of receiving 
it.  
 
                                                 
 
 
30 
See, for example, Careless, J. (2008 Aug 1). Out with the 
Old, in with the New. Urgent Communications, Pg. 8. 
 
31 
Abusch-Magder, D., Bosch, P, et al. (2007) 911-NOW: A 
Network on Wheels for Emergency Response and 
Disaster Recovery Operation. Bell Labs Technical Journal 
11(4), 113-133. Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 
 
Overall, new interface devices have created a 
new set of variables for the 911 emergency 
response system nationwide. Those responsible 
for 911 emergency response must be aware that 
the newer devices impact the system for two 
primary reasons.  
 
First, the newer devices may not easily connect 
to the existing databases that provide caller 
location. Modifications, like those necessitated 
when cellular devices began to proliferate, may 
be required.  
 
Second, although adapting devices to allow for 
access by those with a greater range of abilities 
is a desirable goal, the consequence may be that 
call takers will require additional training, and 
additional time may be required in the center on 
calls using some technology. For instance, the 
state acknowledges that it takes longer for a call 
taker to use the TDD machine when answering a 
call from a hearing-impaired caller. The state 
plan allows for longer times to answer these 
devices (20 seconds, as opposed to 10 for 
standard calls).  
 
There are hundreds of possibilities for what a 
communications interface device may look like 
and how it may operate. More are on the 
horizon, but the device itself is only one part of 
the equation.  From the interface device, the 
signal must travel over some connection, a 
hardwired line or air waves, to the call center.  
This variable, with its relative strengths and 
weaknesses, is the topic of the next section.
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3. THE CONNECTION: The Path over Which the Call Travels Matters 
 
The type of line over which an emergency 
communication travels matters. The path may 
be analog or digital; it may or may not be 
enabled or capable of carrying the best available 
information to the call center.  At the very least, 
it should be possible to reliably send voice 
communications over a connection until 
purposely disconnected.  More recently, it has 
become a mandate that the connection also carry 
the caller’s 10-digit call-back number and the 
caller’s location.  Soon, connections also will 
face the challenge of carrying text from cell 
phones and pictures or video. 
 
A. Wirelines 
Calls are connected to 911 call centers through 
different paths depending upon the type of 
communications interface device utilized. As 
noted earlier, until recently, virtually all 911 
calls were placed on wirelines, also known as 
nonwireless or legacy lines.  When a call is 
placed over a wireline, it then becomes a matter 
of the functionality of the line, the physical 
switches that determine the electronic path, the 
devices the lines travel through and the reach of 
the particular type of connection.  
 
A notable strength of the telephone line systems 
is that they are widely used and dependable.  
The majority of homes already have wirelines 
connecting them to the system, even if they 
choose not to activate service from that line. 
Wirelines are dependable in terms of placing 
and receiving calls and still are the most 
frequently used connection when calling 911. 
That is rapidly changing, however; as noted, last 
year, 15.8 percent of homes reported that they 
had only wireless service.32 
 
Because wireline use is declining, another 
weakness of this connection is often overlooked: 
It is aging.33  Eventually, the entire wired 
infrastructure will have to be replaced, as 
wirelines have a finite life.  However, there 
appears to be little motivation to plan for this 
inevitability. There are more than 1,300 911 
wirelines spanning Florida’s 53-thousand-mile 
landmass. Replacing them as they age 
represents a significant financial undertaking 
that few even have discussed.  
 
Another concern with wirelines is that some that 
connect businesses with many phones are 
grouped together on a single line. These systems 
are known as Private Branch Exchanges (PBX). 
They allow a business to save money by 
establishing an internal closed network for 
calling from office to office. The calls placed 
externally “share” a limited number of lines.  
The significance for E911 is that the external 
line displays the same call-back number and 
location no matter where the caller is in the 
building.  Emergency responders may not be 
                                                 
32 
National Health Interview Survey, 2007 
 
33 
See, for example, Hatfield’s (2003) A Report on Technical 
and Operational Issues Impacting the Provision of 
Wireless Enhanced 911 Services Prepared for the Federal 
Communications Commission  
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able to pinpoint the PBX system caller's 
location. 
The challenges and possibilities of the newer 
wireless technology have far overshadowed 
concern over wirelines. In fact, replacing the old 
wirelines with connections over newer 
technology is virtually the only solution offered 
to the aging wireline threat.  Though the newer 
technology may enhance service and do so more 
cost effectively in the long run, the current state 
of the technology still relies heavily on land 
lines. Moreover, wireless technology still leaves 
gaps in the system for some callers. 
 
B. Wireless 
The proliferation of wireless networks has 
created the most pressing need for 911 reform 
nationwide. Initially, 911 calls placed from 
wireless devices often were unsuccessful. In 
some areas, 911 was not enabled on cellular 
devices, and the connection was not enabled to 
carry caller identification and location, as 
wireline connections could.  
 
Wireless connections are used by cell phones, 
Voice over Internet Protocol devices, automatic 
crash notification devices like OnStar, and a 
host of other devices capable of networking.  
The 911 wireless connections are, at least for 
some of the journey, carried over radio 
frequencies and then converted to wirelines 
dedicated to the emergency call centers, referred 
to as Public Service Answering Points (PSAPs).  
Call takers in some PSAPs, like in Orange 
County, can tell if a call’s origin is wireless or 
wireline depending upon which line it comes in 
on.  
 
Successful wireless transmission relies upon the 
proximity of a cellular tower. Some of the rural 
areas, where there are fewer towers, still do not 
have the same level of reception as other areas.  
It is up to the local authorities to determine if a 
new tower may be erected and where it will go. 
This adds to the fragmented nature of the 
system. 
 
Florida is ahead of many states bringing 
emergency call service over cellular service up 
to par with land lines. Organizations that 
monitor 911 effectiveness, like the National 
Emergency Number Association (NENA), 
consider Florida progressive because it has 
implemented updates to enhance 911 service for 
cellular connections.  Most cellular providers 
are capable of transmitting enhanced 
information; all call centers are technically 
capable of receiving it, though not all do.34
                                                 
34 
Service carriers are required to upgrade services so that 
databases with caller information may be accessed 
through the 911 system. However, for the information to 
be transmitted to a PSAP, the PSAP equipment also must 
be upgraded to receive it, and the PSAP must formally 
notify the carrier that it is ready to do so. According to the 
latest published report, now 15 months old, the process is 
not complete in Florida. See 
http://dms.myflorida.com/suncom/public_safety/florida_e
911/service_providers_information. 
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C. Internet and Satellite 
Calls and information also may travel through 
the internet and satellites.  Many in the 
emergency communications field believe the 
incorporation of these types of connections into 
the 911 emergency response system will solve 
many of the shortcoming found under current 
configurations.  Each offers an alternative that 
alleviates reliance on older land lines and is 
capable of sending enhanced information about 
callers. 
D. Connection Enhancements 
To be considered fully enhanced, connections 
must be capable of sending to a 911 call center 
information about the caller along with the call.  
Namely, the calls should be routed through 
databases that pick up information about the 
number and location of the call originator.  The 
availability of this information greatly enhances 
the public safety community’s ability to send 
the right type of assistance to the right place 
(and, is, therefore, referred to as “enhanced 9-1-
1” or E911). 
Automatic Number Identification (ANI) 
The ability to identify the call-back number of 
the caller is critical to public safety. If the caller 
is disconnected or the call taker hears no voice 
upon answering the 911 call, she can call back 
to reestablish the connection.  The call center 
may find that the 911 call was placed in error 
and verify with the caller that no assistance is 
needed. If the call taker calls the number and it 
is not answered, it often is standard procedure to 
dispatch a unit to the address, if it is known.  In 
the event the caller was able to dial, but unable 
to speak, assistance still may be summoned.   
It is a matter of PSAP protocol how hang-ups 
will be handled and whether a unit will be 
dispatched under such a scenario. That protocol 
is not standardized in Florida. However, the 
ability of the call taker to have access to that 
number enhances the 911 system.  Though 
Florida has made considerable progress in 
number and location-finding technology, some 
connections can deliver that information, while 
others still cannot. 
 
Automatic Location Identification (ALI)  
Closely related to the connection’s ability to 
deliver a call-back number is the connection’s 
ability to carry the location of the caller. In 
connections enabled with Automatic Location 
Identification (ALI), such information appears 
automatically on the screen of the call taker. 
Wirelines are capable of carrying both the voice 
conversation and a “signal” that transmits 
additional information.  The signal was used by 
telephone companies to determine, among other 
things, the duration of the call for billing 
purposes. The billing information, which 
provides a physical street address, was 
necessarily resident within the company 
databases. The signal travels through the 
database to pick up the caller’s location to take 
along with the voice transmission. The signal 
also notifies the company when a call had been 
disconnected. Phone companies used this 
information to bill for the correct number of 
minutes. 911 centers can use this information to 
determine if a caller has hung up or simply is 
not responding on an open line. 
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Though protocol may demand that the call 
takers ask a caller for an address, the call taker 
in many cases is simply verifying an address she 
already sees on her screen when she answers the 
call.  This allows the call taker to identify an 
address, even if she hears no response when she 
answers the call. The databases that hold 
location information for each county are called 
Master Street Address Guide (MSAG).  These 
databases are maintained at the municipal level 
and must be updated when new developments 
are built or annexations occur. They are not 100 
percent accurate, and the state does not compile 
information about the number of errors 
discovered by 911 call takers or others. 
Percent in Florida of population 
  covered by Enhanced 911 Service:    86.1% 
 
Number of counties where all 
  carriers send ALI/ANI:          46 
 
Number of  wirelines dedicated 
  to incoming call center calls:             1,310 
 
Florida’s landmass 
  (square miles):        53,000,000 
 
The availability of wirelines to reliably carry 
enhanced 911 information to the call center 
would seem to be a strength. However, this is 
not the case for several reasons.  First, as noted 
earlier, consumer use of wirelines is declining.  
Newer technology may expand opportunities for 
emergency responders to collect information, 
but the infrastructure is well behind the 
emerging technology. Wirelines have a smaller 
capacity for transmitting information. Second, 
wirelines are deteriorating.  Even when the 
system is fully enhanced to transmit and receive 
wireless communications, 911 calls will 
continue to come in over these lines for years to 
come.  
 
The federal Wireless Act of 1999 directed all 
states to upgrade systems for number and 
location caller identification enhancements. It 
also allowed states to impose a fee on wireline, 
and later cellular, customers to fund the 
upgrades. As previously noted, in Florida, the 
fee in most counties is 50 cents per line (up to 
25 lines) both for wireline and wireless lines. 
The fee is low compared with other states. 
 
All 67 of Florida’s counties are Phase I and II 
compliant, which means that wireline and 
wireless cellular devices are capable of sending 
location and call-back information to call 
centers. All 67 counties report that their call 
centers are capable of receiving the information. 
Therefore, at least on paper, calls placed over 
the wireless network should have no 
disadvantage from a public safety standpoint 
relative to those placed over a wireline. This is 
not necessarily the case. In terms of locating 
wireless calls, a few problems remain. 
 
According to the National Emergency Number 
Association (NENA), a national organization 
that tracks emergency service issues, only 86.1 
percent of Florida’s population has Phase I and 
Phase II service.35  That is because not all 
carriers transmit ANI and ALI data.  
                                                 
35 
NENA/DOT Wireless Deployment Reports (2008).  
http://nena.ddti.net/NationalReport.aspx. 
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There are other concerns about the accuracy of 
caller location information transmitted over 
wireless connections. Attempts to pinpoint the 
location of a cell phone user are imprecise. In 
some cases, determining a cell phone caller's 
location requires calculating the distances from 
the closest cell towers. That may yield a 
longitude and latitude, but not a street address. 
This would create problems in a densely 
populated area, such as a high-rise building. 
Moreover, many people use cell phones when 
they are in their cars.  When this is the case, the 
caller becomes a “rolling target” for rescuers. 
Strengths Weaknesses 
- Wirelines 
  dependable 
- Wirelines aging, less
  often used 
- Wirelines already in 
  place 
- Wirelines have 
  limited capacity for 
  new technologies 
- PBX, grouped lines 
  limit ability to 
  locate calls 
-Wireless ANI/ALI 
  Phase I/II complete 
- ANI/ALI still less 
  than 100% activated 
- Internet expands 
  options for accessing 
  911 
- Internet and satellite
  have no challenges 
  related to locating 
  caller 
- Satellite GPS function 
enabled 
- Low public 
  awareness of 
  limitations of both 
  internet and satellite 
- New technology 
  offers hope of 
  interoperability 
- Coordination of 
radio 
  frequencies 
  incomplete 
 
The emergence of newer technology, like 
automatic crash notification devices and VoIP, 
further complicate efforts to ensure full 
coverage for all 911 callers. The technology that 
sends number and location information of a 
caller to a 911 call taker is not fully integrated 
into the system.  States, including Florida, are 
just beginning to design plans for enhancing 
these signals. In addition, satellite-driven 
Geographic Positioning System technology has 
limitations.  Experts note that GPS may be 
unreliable in skyscrapers. 
 
E. Consumer awareness 
One troubling aspect of Florida's coverage gaps 
is that callers may be unaware that the 
combination of communications device and 
signal may put them at a disadvantage if they 
need emergency services. 
 
Assuming a caller is able to place a 911 call, 
and has access to a communications device that 
transmits a signal over an enhanced connection, 
the question becomes where will that call go?  
That is the topic of the next segment of the 
model.
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4. THE ROUTING – Where the Call Is Answered Depends upon How It Is Routed 
 
Calls placed to 911 ideally are answered by a 
call taker located in a center closest to the 
emergency.  It is a marvel of 
telecommunications technology that is 
transparent and taken for granted by most. How 
is it that a caller can dial the same number 
anywhere in Florida, and the call usually is 
answered locally and not in Milwaukee? 
 
In Florida, there are many overlapping political 
boundaries. Even when the political boundaries 
are discrete, like between counties, calls may 
end up at a center under someone else’s 
jurisdiction. There are several reasons why a 
call might be sent to a call center that has no 
ability or authority to help a caller.  One is the 
type of technology used to send the signal over 
the various paths needed to reach not a just a 
call center, but the closest call center that may 
dispatch help. 
Strengths Weaknesses 
- Selective routing 
  technology helps 911 
  calls go to the closest 
  center 
- Systems without 
  selective routing 
  must create inter- 
  local agreements and 
  transfer misrouted 
  calls 
 
- Systems without 
  selective routing 
  may receive 911 they 
  have to manually 
  transfer to another 
  agency 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Selective Routing 
 
According to the Florida E911 Plan, selective 
routing technology “is considered to be the most 
important feature of a fully enhanced system 
…(that) cannot be overemphasized.”  Call 
centers equipped with selective routing only 
receive calls from within their own jurisdiction. 
This, at least in theory, means that “smart” 
routing will insure that the call only can be sent 
to the call center with authority to directly 
respond. With selective routing, every calling 
device, rather than the location, is tagged with 
an Emergency Service Number (ESN) that 
determines where the call is routed and which 
fire, medical and law enforcement agencies 
have jurisdiction.  
 
At least 28 counties have the more 
technologically advanced selective routing, 
which means there are not required to negotiate 
inter-local agreements for handling misrouted 
calls, though some of them still do. 
 
At least 39 of Florida’s counties use older 
routing methods. Upgrading to selective routing 
would improve overall response time by 
reducing the number of misdirected calls that 
must be transferred. The call transfers from 
county to county or city to county are governed 
by inter-local agreements negotiated bythe 
counties and filed with the state.36  The 
                                                 
36
Information about routing and inter-local agreements are 
taken from county plans on file with the Florida 
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agreements usually specify to which call center 
in the neighboring jurisdiction the call should be 
transferred, so there is a protocol for centers to 
follow when a call taker receives a call from 
another jurisdiction.  Still, one or more call 
transfers means more  opportunities for error 
and more time on the line before help is 
dispatched. Of course, any time a call is 
transferred, critical information (or the call 
itself) may be lost.  
 
Calls also are transferred within the borders of 
each county.  Counties configure their centers in 
many ways and can have varying ways of 
routing an emergency to dispatch.  In regionally 
combined centers, one call center may serve as 
both the centralized call center and primary 
dispatcher for the entire region.  In such cases, 
there is no need to transfer a call received at (for 
example) a sheriff’s office primary call center to 
a secondary medical emergency call center. 
Help can be dispatched immediately. 
 
 
 
 
Combined centers, such as the one in Alachua 
County, simply radio directly to needed units for 
                                                                               
Department of Management Services 
http://dms.myflorida.com/suncom/public_safety/ 
florida_911/florida_e911_plan.  However, it should be 
noted that some of the plans are dated 2005 or earlier. 
Overlap problems in these instances may already have 
been remedied. 
 
 
response.  However, even in the few counties 
that have attempted to consolidate call taking 
and dispatch under one roof, there are 
exceptions to the rule. Even Alachua County, a 
county designated as a national “flagship” for its 
sound communications practices, must transfer 
some calls out of the call center.37  At least two 
municipalities in that county “opted out” of the 
regionally combined dispatch. In fact, all of 
Florida’s 67 counties are transferring 911 calls 
at least some of the time within (and, as noted 
earlier, sometimes across) their boundaries 
before dispatch. 
 
The necessity of transferring calls from one 
PSAP to another within a county or across 
county lines represents a significant 
vulnerability in the 911 system.  However, even 
when the call reaches the appropriate agency, 
another set of factors specific to the call center 
determines how and when the call will be 
handled.  
 
Selective routing is a strength for 911 systems; 
those counties without it represent system 
weaknesses.  The state E911 Board continues to 
work toward funding weaker systems through 
proportional distribution of E911 Trust Fund 
collection (discussed in other sections) and 
grants targeted to rural counties that often lack 
this technology.
                                                 
37
Alachua County was designated as a national 
Commission on Accreditation and Law Enforcement 
Agencies, Inc., flagship for its “best practices.” 
 
Number of counties with selective routing:     28  
Percent of counties with selective routing:      42% 
Number of counties with inter-local 
  agreements to transfer misrouted calls:         31 
Number of counties with inter-local 
  agreements w/ more than one other PSAP:   17 
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5. THE PUBLIC SAFETY ANSWERING POINT – All Call Centers Are Local 
 
The federal intent of 911 across the country is to 
make sure each time the three digits 911 are 
called, the Public Safety Answering Point 
(PSAP) closest to the caller answers the call.  As 
noted earlier, some consider this the termination 
point of the 911 system. Insofar as a center 
operates to answer calls, a specific funding 
source, the E911 Trust Fund, is available to 
support equipment and, recently, training.  
Policies have largely focused only on getting the 
call this far. Industry experts, such as the 
National Emergency Number Association 
(NENA) and others, consider Florida a 
progressive state in its ability to facilitate call 
connection to this point.38  
However, the individual attributes of the PSAP  
matter. There is tremendous variation in the 
resources and abilities present within each of the 
258 call centers in the state. These call 
answering centers have been called the “weakest 
link in the E911 chain.”39 This is not because 
they are inherently incapable; it is simply 
because of the tremendous variability among 
PSAPs in terms of their technological 
capabilities and management, and the fact that 
there is no oversight to determine how effective 
any of them are. 
 
                                                 
38
Telephone Interview with Roger Hixon, Technology 
Issues Director, NENA, December 2008. 
 
39
Weiser, P., Hatfield, D. Bernthal, B. (Spring 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The technological variables of the PSAPs are 
likely the most numerous of any point in 
emergency response process. Each PSAP 
represents a unique combination of equipment 
and personnel.  It must have the infrastructure to 
accept calls, to process calls and to dispatch 
units. At this point in the model, when a caller 
has the ability to call 911, has a device that 
recognizes 911, and is relayed to the closest 
PSAP, another set of variables comes into play.  
The call now must be received by the PSAP.  
That is, simply because an electronic 
communication is sent, it does not mean every 
PSAP is capable of accepting it.  It does not 
mean that each call will be answered. 
The ability of the call to register at the 
appropriate PSAP, once it is correctly routed 
there, is largely a function of the technological 
and infrastructure capabilities of the PSAP. 
They include the number of incoming trunk 
lines, the number of call takers present, the 
number and type of incoming and transfer lines, 
the type of call answering and recording  
equipment, computers with monitors and 
software to register and process calls, mapping 
capabilities and adequate facility space.
Number of PSAPs:             258 
Percent of PSAPs fully upgraded 
  with number and location receiving:            86%
Number of PSAPs with 
  national accreditation:     3 
Number of counties with 
 backup PSAPs:       7 
Total number of PSAP staff:         5,498 
Number of mishandled calls: Unknown
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Strengths Weaknesses 
- All PSAPs are capable of receiving enhanced 
  signal 
- Less than 100 percent of PSAPs receive 
  enhanced service from all carriers 
- State requires recording of incoming calls - Not all have instant playback 
- E911 Coordinator designated in each county - Coordinator sometimes offsite,  and 
  coordinates only some  aspects of service 
- Some Florida county PSAPs accredited by 
  international agencies 
- Accreditation expensive, time consuming 
- Computer-aided stations used to help process 
  calls in some counties 
- No standardization of equipment or training 
- Availability of alternate 311 number for non 
  emergencies 
- Underutilization of alternative possibilities, 
  like 311 
- Backup call centers established in some 
  counties in case a call center is disabled 
- There is a down time between the time a 
  center is disabled and the time the backup is 
  online. Only 7 counties have backups 
- Staff positions equal to number of stations - Many positions not filled 
- Standardized calculation for staff based upon 
  call load available 
- Growth outpacing upgrades in rural counties 
- Training standards set at state level - Training optional at local level 
- Potential for consolidation - Few centers consolidated 
- Protocols may be customized for a specific 
  area or region 
- No state oversight of call center procedures or
  effectiveness 
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A. Growth 
Experts in the field help calculate the number of 
incoming lines a call center requires to handle 
call loads. Still, the number requires 
consideration. Florida continues to grow, and 
along with that growth comes the need for 
additional lines. Growth throughout Florida is 
not distributed evenly. Some of the smallest 
counties with the humblest of resources 
experienced explosive growth from 1990-2000. 
For example, on Florida’s central western coast, 
rural Sumter County has just seven incoming 
lines. It is one of the counties experiencing the 
most rapid growth (+68.9 percent).  
 
Growth, especially in northern rural counties, 
likely outpaces the state’s ability to catch up 
technologically.  Not only are the rural counties 
at a disadvantage technologically, they have 
very few representatives in the state legislature 
to argue for additional funding.40 Additionally, 
revenues from municipal sources, such as 
property taxes, are meager in rural counties.  
Many of the components needed for a robust 
response system must be funded locally. 
 
B. ANI/ALI Issues at the PSAP level 
Ensuring that PSAPs are capable of receiving 
incoming signals is separate from the ability of a 
telephone or cell phone to send it over a 
connection. Compliance with federal and state 
                                                 
40
Hill, K., MacManus, S. and Mareno, D., eds., (2004). 
Florida’s Politics. John Scott Daily Florida Institute of 
Government: Tallahassee, FL. 
 
guidelines at this stage requires a PSAP to have 
the ability to at least receive wireless 
transmission with call-back number and location 
information, if available. All of Florida’s 
counties have indicated their PSAPs are capable 
of receiving this information. However, as 
previously noted, that does not mean that each 
of the PSAPs actually is receiving it, or that 
each is receiving it from every carrier in their 
service area.   
 
A PSAP first must notify each telecommun-
ications company operating in its jurisdiction 
that it is capable of receiving its enhanced 
signal.  The company then has a limited amount 
of time to find a way to start sending it, if it has 
not already done so.   
 
For instance, Gulf County has notified the state 
that it is Phase I and Phase II capable, meaning 
it is capable of receiving call-back number and 
location information from both wireline and 
wireless callers. All of the cellular providers that 
operate in Gulf County are capable of sending 
both cell number and coordinates of a caller to 
the county PSAP.  However, in mid-2008, there 
was as least one carrier that the county has not 
yet officially notified.  Since that carrier has not 
been notified that Gulf County PSAPs are 
capable of receiving enhanced information from 
it, it is not required to send it.  Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that callers using that 
carrier in Gulf County will be harder to find 
than those using another carrier until this is 
resolved.  
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That is not to say Gulf County was remiss in 
some way.  The carrier may have only recently 
started providing service in the area.  The point 
is that new carriers will continue to move into 
the state, and as they do, each of the counties in 
which they operate must request ANI and ALI 
service. During this time, there will be some gap 
in service for the caller using that new provider. 
 
C. E911 Coordinator 
Every county has one person designated as the 
E911 coordinator.  This is a strength for Florida. 
It ensures that one person in each county is 
responsible for monitoring needs and approving 
allowed equipment purchases. Through the 
coordinators, there at least is the possibility that 
call taking systems have some level of 
standardization.  Unfortunately, the individual 
counties determine how the E911 coordinator 
fits into the county’s emergency services 
structure. In some cases, the coordinator is 
stationed within a primary PSAP, but sometimes 
is affiliated with another agency that is not even 
a call center. 
 
D. Consolidation of services 
 A few call centers have consolidated regionally 
to more efficiently coordinate provision of 
services in a geographic area. The E911 Board 
notes that consolidation reduces overhead costs, 
and experts say it eliminates gray areas of 
jurisdictional overlap. However, there are 
logistical and practical limitations to how large 
an area may be consolidated for a single call 
center. Local knowledge of terrain is helpful in 
guiding first responders to the scene of an 
emergency.41 
E. Staffing 
Staffing the center also is a challenge. By 
definition, call takers operate in an environment 
that involves emergencies. Frequently, call 
takers must answer calls that deal with life and 
death situations. They must remain calm and 
administer the best assistance they are trained to 
handle. Nevertheless, salaries for this position 
are low and the hours are long.  
 
At the PSAP level, managers are required to 
staff at levels that provide adequate service.  
The state E911 plan specifies that calls should 
be answered in 10 seconds 90 percent of the 
time (20 seconds for TDD lines). Keeping staff 
levels high enough to meet this standard has 
been identified as a problem. Combined with 
increasing call loads, 911 callers may be waiting 
longer for an answer.42 Because so many PSAPs 
have difficulty recruiting staff, employees often 
are required to serve mandatory overtime. Some 
call center managers noted that this has led to 
problems in overall morale and retention.
                                                 
41
An observation made by state Sen. Stephen Oelrich, who 
was formerly a sheriff in Alachua County when it created 
a consolidated county-wide call center. 
 
42
Alachua County bureau chief Linda Jones noted that in 
mid- to large-sized counties, staffing can be a problem. 
She said she has had as many as a quarter of the call-taker 
positions vacant and is continually looking for ways, such 
as Internet postings, to recruit call takers. 
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F. Call loads 
Florida's rapid growth meant that call loads for 
911 centers also continually increased. That 
growth has flattened, and the state's total call 
load declined nearly 5 percent, from 15.2 
million calls in 2007 to 14.5 million in 2008, but 
it is reasonable to expect that growth to 
rebound. There also are no statewide figures 
examining county-by-county call loads; some 
jurisdictions probably are still seeing increases. 
As mentioned earlier, new technology also has 
resulted in a greater number of 911 calls and 
that is expected to continue. 
G. N11 Options 
Just as 911 was established to handle emergency 
calls, the FCC has approved other universal 
three-digit numbers to connect callers with 
services. The availability of these numbers 
could reduce the number of non-emergency 
calls 911 call takers must process.   
 
For instance, the FCC has designated 311 as an 
additional non-emergency information number. 
Again, it is up to each county whether and how 
to use this number. News stories emerge daily 
about 911 calls reporting incorrect fast food 
orders or legitimate, but non-emergency, 
inquiries like power outage reports. State 
coordinators estimate that nearly 50 percent of 
the calls to Florida 911 centers are non-
emergency.  
 
Orange County has a fully functional 311 
system, while Alachua County utilizes these 
lines only some of the time, such as during 
hurricane recovery. Other counties are not able 
to segregate the calls at all. Though there clearly 
are advantages to opening the lines for true 
emergencies, even this solution has its 
weaknesses. 
 
First, there is a question of who should staff the 
311 lines. Since the calls coming in on 311 
should not be emergency calls, it would make 
sense that the call takers would not require 
extensive training.  However, sometimes those 
with true emergencies might call 311 instead of 
911. The call taker must be prepared to identify 
an emergency coming in on the 311 line and 
summon appropriate emergency assistance.  The 
level of training recommended for a call taker in 
this position would represent another gray area 
that may increase the fragmented nature of the 
system overall.  Second, there is the issue of 
funding.  Presumably, the 311 calls would not 
be covered by funding secured for the 911 
system, even though the alternative improves 
the 911 system by reducing its burden. 
 
H. Center training and certification   
A number of organizations provide 
recommended protocols to help center managers 
cope with the myriad challenges of equipment, 
staffing, and the many administrative functions, 
like logging call problems and managing 
budgets.  
 
National organizations like the Commission on 
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies 
(CALEA) provide management and 
organizational guidelines to enhance call center 
performance. The accreditation process is 
rigorous and expensive. Only three 
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communications centers in the state—Alachua 
County, Citrus County and Sarasota County—
hold the CALEA accreditation for their call 
centers. Keeping the certification not only 
represents an application expense, it represents a 
cost in additional staff hours required to compile 
and report the required information on 
standardized forms. 
 
I. Call answering equipment 
There is no coordination of the type of 
equipment purchased in each call center.  
Coordinators only determine whether the 
equipment meets standards that allow the 
purchase to be reimbursed from E911 Trust 
funds.  Therefore, there are endless possibilities 
for system configurations.  Further, since 
funding only covers call answering equipment, 
but not dispatching equipment, the configuration 
of the center depends upon its ability to cobble 
together resources to dispatch assistance to the 
caller.
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6. CALL TAKING – Abilities of the Call Taker Affect System Success 
 
The next set of variables in the system 
acknowledges the role played by the specific 
telecommunicator who answers any given call.  
There is an important distinction in Florida 
made between the call taker and the call 
dispatcher, though some use the terms “call 
taker” and “dispatcher” interchangeably. 
However, the two functions within the system 
are completely different from a funding 
perspective.  The call taker is the first person a 
distressed caller speaks with. The call taker 
decides whether the call is, in fact, an 
emergency. If the call truly is an emergency, the 
call taker determines what type of assistance the 
caller needs.   
 
The professional who decides how many units 
to send and from which agency those units will 
be deployed is performing a dispatch, not call 
taking, function.  The dispatcher communicates 
with the rescue agencies, or directly with the 
rescue personnel, to direct them to the scene. In 
some call centers  the call taker may also act as 
the dispatcher. At others, the dispatcher may be 
at another work station, or even another office. 
Strengths Weaknesses 
- Training standard 
  established at 208 
  hours 
- Training not 
  mandatory for 
  counties 
- State standards set 
  for maximum 
  response time 
- No state audit of 
  response time 
- Call recording 
  equipment captures 
  call handling 
  information 
- Call handling 
  information kept 
  only at county level; 
  no external oversight 
 
A. Disparate funding opportunities 
Making the distinction is important for several 
reasons. First, the funding mechanisms that 
supplement call taker costs are not the same as 
those that supplement dispatcher costs.  
Florida’s E911 Trust Fund guidelines specify 
that only those activities related to call taking, 
and not dispatching, may be reimbursed from 
the fund. 
 
A call taker may have a very limited range of 
responsibilities or one that encompasses many. 
That is determined by the individual call center. 
If a call taker also acts as a dispatcher, salary 
and training expenses may only be recovered 
from E911 funds for the percentage of the time 
the employee is specifically engaged in 
answering 911 calls. 
 
This is a characteristic of Florida’s emergency 
system that accounts for some of the system’s 
fragmentation. Therefore, one of the 
recommendations of this study is that 
coordination and support of 911 services should 
extend fully from the call placer to the first 
responder(s) on the scene. 
B. Training 
It is important to note that, at this time, each of 
those 1,300 call-taking positions may be staffed 
by a person with many years’ experience and 
training or none at all. This is one of the most 
contentious issues in Florida’s 911 emergency 
response system. 
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Florida is near the top of all states in terms of 
the number of hours of training a call taker 
should have before answering E911 calls. 
Dispatch Magazine maintains of list of training 
requirements across the states.  That list is 
included in Appendix B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Only five states specify more call taker training 
than Florida (Nevada has the most, with 480); 
however, 27 states make the training hours 
mandatory.  Florida does not.43 It may 
recommend more hours than other states, but 
that does not mean Florida's call takers are 
better trained than those in other states.  In fact, 
it does not mean that call takers are trained at 
all.  There is nothing to prevent a person with no 
experience and no training from answering 911 
calls and making decisions the first day on the 
job.   
 
Prior to 2007, Florida had neither a mandate nor 
a recommendation for training and certification 
of 911 emergency response call takers.  In 2007, 
the state passed legislation acknowledging that 
                                                 
43
Dispatch Magazine, 
www.911dispatch.com/training/training+survey.html. 
 
call takers should have standardized training. 
However, legislators stopped short of directing 
the counties to train call takers. The Denise 
Amber Lee Act recommends, but does not 
mandate, 208 hours of training for call taker 
certification. 
 
There are existing programs offered by private 
entities and public institutions, like community 
colleges, that have developed curricula to 
properly train call takers. Funds available 
through the E911 Trust Fund may be used to 
pay for call taker training.  The state does not 
monitor which counties train staff. 
 
It would seem in the state's best interest to use 
E911 Trust funds and other sources to train call 
takers. However, some fear training will raise 
expenses because trained call takers will require 
higher salaries.  Further, some are concerned 
that meeting training requirements may require 
vesting call takers in retirement programs that 
first responders in high-risk categories receive.44 
However, others note that providing training 
and certification helps agencies attract and 
retain better employees.45  Over the long run, 
this may result in cost savings and better service 
provision.
                                                 
44
By the end of the 2009 legislative session, the Sheriff’s 
Association had reversed earlier opposition and moved to 
support mandatory training.  The Florida Police Chiefs 
Association remained opposed. 
 
45  
Interview with City of Gainesville Fire Chief Bill 
Northcutt. 
 
Number of states that 
  mandate call-taker training:         27 
Number of hours recommended 
  call-taker training:        208 
Number of call-taking 
  positions in Florida:    1,307 
Number of hours required 
  call-taker training in Florida:        0 
Number of call takers who have 
  more than 0 hours training:   Unknown 
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7. THE DISPATCH – Call Handoffs Can Mean Time and Money 
 
Once a call taker has determined that an 
emergency exists, someone must make the 
determination regarding which specific unit or 
units should be sent to the scene.  That decision 
is made by the dispatcher. 
 
Again, as already noted, one of the most 
important points about dispatch is that its 
activities are not covered by the state E911 
Trust Fund. In fact, statutes specifically prohibit 
E911 Trust Fund revenues from paying for 
dispatch activities. Every portion of emergency 
response from this point forward is left for the 
counties to fund on their own.    
 
This is one of the most critical aspects left 
unaddressed when experts discuss developing 
an effective and seamless 911 system. If a call 
taker also acts as a call dispatcher (more 
common in rural counties), only the percentage 
of  time taking calls and training to take calls 
can be paid with E911 Trust funds. 
Strengths Weaknesses 
- New technology 
  will improve 
  communication 
- Old technology used 
  in many agencies 
- Counties submit 
  dispatch plans to 
  state 
- No central dispatch 
  authority in any 
  county 
- Funding for devices 
  not covered by E911 
  Trust Fund 
 
In no other point in the process are there greater 
possibilities for fragmentation in the state’s 
ability to facilitate communications among first  
 
responders. Dispatch is left to the counties. The 
only dispatch function even partially funded and 
coordinated by the state is radio communication 
among dispatchers and responding agencies. 
 
Protocol for dispatching assistance to the scene 
is not coordinated at the state level. The call 
taker’s options for summoning personnel to 
respond to the scene is determined by the call 
center configuration, protocol for dispatch and 
the equipment over which she will dispatch 
help.  The dispatch apparatus varies across the 
258 PSAPs throughout the state. 
 
A. Call taking and dispatch functions 
Some call centers dispatch only for the agencies 
in which they are housed.  For instance, if a call 
center is housed in a sheriff’s office, the call 
taker or co-located dispatcher may communicate 
directly with deputies in the field to activate 
them. However, if the call is for fire rescue, he 
may transfer the call to the city or county fire 
department, whose dispatcher would determine 
which stations and units should respond.  As 
previously noted, very few call centers directly 
dispatch all fire, medical and law enforcement 
services. All transfer at least some of the calls to 
another agency for dispatch.   
 
Clearly, any time a call is transferred, time is 
lost, and the call may be lost as well. It adds one 
more point in the process at which something 
might go awry. Many different systems are used 
to transfer calls from call taking to call dispatch. 
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Some calls are transferred over a telephone line. 
Of those transferred over a telephone line, some 
systems are wired such that the call taker can 
press just one button to transfer the call. Others 
are more complex. 
 
Calls not transferred over land line may be 
transferred by radio. Computer-aided dispatch 
helps coordinate the network when all agencies 
can access the system and monitor it for calls 
that might come their way.  Computers with 
mapping capabilities also help dispatchers 
determine which units are closest to an 
emergency. 
 
Time of response from dispatch reception to 
“wheels on the road” and arrival at the scene is 
subject to state standards.  The ability to meet 
those standards may be attributed to the 
responding agency or personnel. Fire trucks 
may not leave the station immediately, for 
example, because the equipment used to 
summon them is slow.  Alachua County staff 
said that if more than one unit is needed, they 
still only have the ability to summon one at a 
time.  The dispatcher must send a tone over the 
dispatch radio to the station, wait, announce the 
emergency, wait, send another tone to another 
station, and so forth.  The dispatcher must finish 
notifying all stations before dispatching for 
other emergencies. 
 
B. Consolidation  
As noted, some counties have attempted to save 
money and improve coordination by combining 
call taking and dispatch functions into a single 
center. If one central agency can receive all the 
911 calls for a county or region, and also have 
the authority to decide which and how many 
units must be sent to the scene, efficiency 
should improve.   
 
The call center in Alachua County is one 
example of a consolidated call center. Rather 
than maintaining a call center within each 
municipality within the county, the call taking, 
processing and most dispatching functions were 
merged into one center. The center is located 
within and operated by the Alachua County 
Sheriff’s Office, and each municipality served 
by the center contributes funds to maintain it.  
 
Some law-enforcement officials have suggested 
that call center functions could be combined for 
even larger geographical regions. For instance, 
two or more counties could merge functions and 
share resources. The money saved from 
eliminating any duplicated services may be used 
to upgrade equipment, facilities or training.  
 
Under this scenario, service to those within the 
region would be improved provided that the 
region is not too large.  How large of a region 
should be considered is a subjective decision. 
Consolidating too great an area could cause 
problems; for example, a dispatcher in 
Jacksonville might not know the roadways in 
rural Alachua County well enough to always 
dispatch the appropriate units.46 
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Interview with state Sen. Stephen Oelrich. 
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8. THE SUMMONED AGENCY – Keeping Responders Connected 
 
Once a dispatcher determines which agency or 
agencies to activate, he must be able to 
communicate that need to the agency.  As on the 
“consumer access” side, this is a matter of both 
the ability to send the call and the agency’s 
ability to receive it.  The agency and its first 
responders also must be able to maintain contact 
with each other and with dispatch for updated 
information.  The ability of systems to “talk” to 
one another at this segment is critical. 
Strengths Weaknesses 
- Florida 
  Interoperability 
  Network (FIN) helps 
  coordinate response 
- Interoperability of 
  responder radios 
- 800 MHz 
  re-banding will 
  reduce interference 
  from non- 
  emergency frequency 
  users 
- Re-banding 
  incomplete 
- Some radio 
  expenses funded 
  through traffic 
  citation assessments 
- No funding available 
  from E911 trust fund 
 
There is an irony to note, in that recent policy 
and funding changes made to bolster 911 
systems occurred when it became apparent that 
first responders may not be able to communicate 
with one another. As noted earlier, the issue of 
first responder radio interoperability moved up 
on the public agenda after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks. However, that equipment used by 
Florida's first responders is not covered by E911 
Trust funds. 
 
A. Radio interoperability 
The radios used by first responders in Florida, 
those who physically arrive first at an 
emergency situation, are not part of the E911 
system as defined by statute. The state compiles 
a Radio Communications plan to coordinate 
communications devices used by law 
enforcement agencies, as required by F.S. 
282.111.  The statute directs the Department of 
Management Services to “develop and maintain 
a statewide system of regional law enforcement 
communications.”  The plan notes that the 
system does not cover devices used by 
consumers to call 911, because that system 
comes under the E911 statutes.  
 
In 2004, the state contracted with M/A- Com to 
work toward providing 800 MHz radios to every 
sworn and non-sworn public safety official who 
required network connection.47  The Statewide 
Law Enforcement Radio System (SLERS) and 
M/A-Com continue to work together to 
complete this process. However, again, there is 
no formal mechanism to monitor how well 
M/A-Com’s radios are working, which 
represents a vulnerability.  In New York, the 
same company won the contract to provide 
interoperable radios, but there was a 
requirement to test the system’s effectiveness. 
The system often failed. It is unclear whether 
Florida’s equipment has had a similar test. 
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Currently, radios in the state are known to use 
diverse technologies and operate on different 
frequencies. Currently in use are UHS, UVS, 
800 MHz, and “Platform 25,” to name a few.  
 
B. 800 MHz issue 
Another area that affects how effectively help is 
dispatched is the band over which dispatchers 
communicate with other agencies and 
responders, and over which individual 
responders communicate with their base and 
each other. The idea is that specific frequencies 
should be dedicated to emergency 
communications so that other calls are not 
interfering with these transmissions. 
 
To resolve the problem of interoperability, 
radios are being converted to operate in a 
specific realm of the 800 MHz bandwidth.  
Bandwidth has been reserved for this use.  
Unfortunately, because of the proliferation of 
cellular companies, some non-safety 
communications are encroaching on these 
waves, causing interference for responders.  The 
state has established a plan to “re-band” the 800 
MHz frequency to reserve it for emergency use. 
However, even if the re-band issue is fully 
addressed and agencies all convert to 800 MHz 
radios, that technology is rapidly becoming 
outdated.
Florida 911 
Page 54 of 68 
 
9. VEHICULAR TRAVEL – Keeping a Clear Path 
 
The last leg of the trip in the process from 
emergency caller to emergency response is the 
physical travel from the remote location to the 
scene.  Obviously, many factors outside the 
system architecture affect the amount of time it 
takes a unit to arrive on the scene once it 
receives a dispatched call. 
 
However, the factors are worth noting because 
the decisions of local government entities may 
have an unintended effect of reducing or 
increasing response time.  In addition to the 
federal and state policies that might affect 
conditions, such as placement and condition of 
roads, government facilities and building codes, 
Florida’s 67 counties and 412 municipalities 
each may create policy that affects response 
time. 48  
Strengths Weaknesses 
- Local planning that 
  improves traffic flow 
- Local planning that 
  ignores traffic flow 
 
Trends in urban planning affect traffic patterns 
at the local level. For example, the recent 
incorporation of “new urbanism” perspectives 
into city planning are designed to create more 
compact, and thereby, from a public services 
standpoint, more efficient communities.  Along 
with these practices are often plans to “calm 
traffic” and create pedestrian-friendly venues.   
 
                                                 
48
Florida League of Cities, www.flacities.com. 
 
 
However, there is at least anecdotal evidence 
that city officials dismiss the concerns of public 
safety officials when considering such devices 
as traffic circles.49 City planners designing 
streets without input from emergency response 
organizations may unintentionally increase how 
long it takes for first responders to arrive on the 
scene. 
 
The realities of vehicular travel also must be 
considered from a training perspective. Callers 
or dispatchers new to a community may be 
unfamiliar with topographical features and 
traffic patterns that might slow emergency 
vehicles.  Even with a standardized statewide 
training curriculum, PSAPs would need to have 
available resources to train call takers and 
dispatchers in situations specific to that center 
or area.
                                                 
49
Interview with Gainesville Fire Chief Bill Northcutt, 
October 2008. 
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VI. Summary and Discussion of Findings 
The analysis revealed that Florida does not have 
a 911 “system,” but a patchwork of agencies, 
protocols and technologies loosely cobbled 
together to respond to 911 calls.   To create a 
“seamless end-to-end” emergency response 
system, Florida must overcome the 
fragmentation and establish a coordinated 911 
emergency response system.  
 
The nature of the fragmentation in areas that 
affect 911 are summarized below in seven key 
findings that represent challenges for 911 
service provision. Each finding is accompanied 
by a recommendation or recommendations and a 
discussion of the issue. 
Finding 1: 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 1a 
Redefine 911 as a comprehensive Emergency 
Response System inclusive of all aspects of 
government emergency service provision from 
the time a caller dials 9-1-1 to the time help 
arrives on the scene. 
Recommendation 1b 
Assign a state-level position or committee to 
oversee and coordinate all aspects of emergency 
response in Florida, from the time a caller 
attempts to place a call to the time assistance 
arrives at the scene. Individual or committee 
should have the authority to: 
• collect comprehensive incident reports 
from call centers; 
• evaluate and approve emergency 
response equipment that will 
interconnect with other equipment used 
in the state; 
• evaluate call center protocol; 
• insure that all emergency response 
personnel have adequate training; 
• establish minimum standards for call 
handling and disciplinary procedures for 
those who make critical errors; 
• evaluate county comprehensive plans to 
determine if local zoning plans are 
consistent with provision of superior 
response to 911 calls. 
 
Recommendation 1c 
Establish a statewide blue ribbon task force of 
all stakeholders in Florida’s emergency 
response community, including representatives 
from law, medical and fire emergency rescue 
agencies, the legislature, telecommunications 
industry, private and community college 
training programs, state departments that 
facilitate 911 response and the public, to study 
the feasibility of these and other 
recommendations for improving Florida’s 911 
and emergency response system. 
Florida has no one board, office or person 
with the authority to monitor how effectively 
calls for emergency assistance are handled, 
and has no statewide data to assess error 
rate, response time or any other measure of 
the delivery of service. 
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Discussion 
One of the biggest challenges Florida faces in 
creating a 911 emergency response system that 
is “seamless” and “end-to-end” is a semantic 
one. Stakeholders interviewed by the consulting 
firm often held differing views of what is, and 
what is not, part of the 911 system.  There 
appears to be a false assumption that everyone 
holds the same idea of where the system 
terminates.  Is it when the call is answered, as 
F.S. 365 suggests by funding only for activities 
related to calling 911? Or is it when emergency 
personnel resolve the emergency? 
 
A public discussion among stakeholders must 
start with a clear definition of what Floridians 
believe and what the 911 system should entail. 
It would be helpful to determine what public 
expectations are with regard to the 911 system. 
 
At the very least, there must be a high-level 
official assigned to unify and monitor the 
various segments of the 911 emergency 
response system to address in a coordinated 
fashion all those elements that are activated 
from the time a caller needs assistance to the 
time it arrives.  This includes consideration and 
coordination of, at the very least, equipment, 
protocol and personnel needs. States with strong 
oversight are ahead of those without it in terms 
of deploying the latest technology for 911 
emergency response.50  Though Florida has a 
                                                 
50
See Weiser, P., Hatfield, D. and Bernthal, B. (Spring 
2008) and Monitor Group Accelerating Deployment of 
Nationwide E911 Summary Finding of the NENA SWAT 
E911 Stakeholder’s Initiative (2003)), available at 
http://www.911monitor.com/Summary.pdf. 
 
codified E911 Board, it is small, lacks diversity 
and has few powers besides overseeing 
disbursements.  
 
Two cautionary notes are appropriate here.  
First, it is unlikely that central coordination will 
find wide public acceptance if that central 
authority has the ability to issue what amounts 
to unfunded mandates.  Already groups have 
mobilized to defeat suggested improvements in 
the system, like mandatory training for call 
takers (discussed in Finding 2), because of 
concern that local budgets cannot be stretched to 
accommodate it.51  A broadened scope of 
activities that may be funded through state E911 
Trust Funds must accompany any establishment 
of such a position.  
 
Second, call centers must not fear disciplinary 
action upon surrendering incident reports.  It is 
unlikely that those who supervise call centers 
will support such centralized reporting unless 
there are assurances that data will be used to 
improve the system (as it is with airport traffic 
controllers), and not to  punish centers when 
mistakes occur. Resolving individual incidents 
should remain at the local level, though there 
should be some consistency in procedures and 
consequences when dealing with errors.
                                                 
51
See, for example, the Florida Police Chiefs Association’s 
legislative priorities for 2009 
(http://www.fpca.com/2009legislativepriorities.htm). 
Among them is a specific position against mandatory 
training requirements. 
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Finding 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 2a 
Increase 911 collection from the current $0.50 
maximum and attach such fees to all newer 
telecommunications devices as provided for in 
Florida Statutes. 
 
Recommendation 2b 
Amend Florida statutes to expand the range of 
expenses that may be covered by the E911 Trust 
Fund to include all aspects of emergency 
response. 
 
Discussion 
As it now stands, Florida 911 coordinators 
estimate that 61 to 66 percent of 911-related 
fees are covered by the E911 Trust Fund. 
Counties must find resources to cover the rest. 
That estimate considers solely the expenses that 
are considered 911-related under Florida 
statute—those expenses incurred by calling 911. 
Counties accrue many expenses responding to 
911 calls that are not considered part of the 911 
system, for funding purposes, and therefore are 
not  reimbursed.  Therefore, if the definition of 
911 and its funding source is expanded, as 
herein suggested, a clearer picture of financial 
needs will emerge.  Because a greater range of 
expenses may be reimbursed, there must be an 
increase in funding. Florida's economy makes it 
unlikely that the state or counties can find 
additional revenue from  traditional sources. 
Finding 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 3a 
Minimum standards for training, protocol and 
equipment should be mandated for all call 
centers such that each has 
• appropriately trained and certified 
personnel to answer, process and 
dispatch calls; 
• protocol for handling calls based upon 
emergency-industry established best 
practices; 
• call answering, dispatch and field 
communications equipment that is 
compatible within and across all 
emergency service agencies in 
Florida. 
 
Discussion 
In 2008, legislation passed that created training 
standards for personnel involved in processing 
911 calls. Groups such as the Association of 
Public-Safety Communications Officials 
(APCO) and the Denise Amber Lee Foundation 
seek to make training mandatory.  The APCO 
website correctly notes that firefighters, police 
officers and even hairdressers must be state 
Florida underfunds its 911 system. Florida's 
911 fees are in the bottom third of all states, 
its fee collections are declining and it pays 
less than two-thirds of the cost of 911 service, 
leaving the rest to cash-strapped counties. 
And state law prohibits spending 911 funding 
on dispatch services, seen as an integral part, 
if not the purpose, of a 911 system. 
Florida's 911 calls are answered in 258 call 
centers, all with their own standards for 
training, protocol and equipment. Florida 
recommends, but does not mandate, training 
for 911 call takers. As a result, centers do not 
necessarily employ industry best practices 
and standards, and Floridians receive uneven 
levels of service. 
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certified, yet the person who answers a 911 call 
need not.  A move toward mandatory 
certification also may help call center managers 
retain currently employed call takers and attract 
new applicants.52 
 
Finding 4 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 4a 
Increase funding for the state’s 30 rural counties 
through non-recurring funding until all rural call 
centers provide services comparable to urban 
ones.  
 
Recommendation 4b 
Allow counties with underfunded 911 call 
centers to establish Municipal Services Taxing 
Units (MSTU) to provide a recurring source of 
finding for provision of E911 emergency 
response services. 
 
Recommendation 4c 
Provide grant-writing assistance for rural 
counties. 
 
Discussion 
Call centers operating in rural counties will need 
assistance to insure that emergency callers in 
                                                 
52
Interview with Bill Northcutt, City of Gainesville Fire 
Chief, October 2008. 
 
those areas receive the same level of service that 
callers in larger counties receive. Though call 
volumes are lower in the rural counties, the 
resources to handle calls are often outdated 
relative to equipment used in urban ones.  
 
This report does not include a technical analysis 
of all the equipment used by the counties for 
call taking, and therefore cannot conclude that 
equipment used by rural counties is inferior to 
that used in urban counties.  However, even a 
review of the equipment listed on county reports 
filed with the state found a wide range of 
equipment in use, and that rural and urban 
counties use clearly different technology. 
 
Part of the reason rural counties are at a 
disadvantage in E911 funding is due to the 
structure of the allocations.  Money collected 
from customers to support 911 is returned to 
each county based upon the number of 
customers in that county.  Clearly, if very few 
people contract for service in an area, even if the 
area is geographically large, the fees charged 
will not represent a great deal of revenue for the 
county.   
 
This is a problem because rural counties in 
Florida are growing more rapidly than the 
national average for growth.  This means there 
likely will be a lag between the time population 
increases and the time, if any, that resources 
levels are adequate.  
 
In the last two years, Florida has earmarked 
funding to help rural counties upgrade.  Federal 
Florida's 911 system still has a rural-urban 
divide, even though a stated goal of federal 
law establishing modern 911 systems is to 
improve service to rural areas. 
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grants are available as well.53 However, the 
county must have personnel with the time and 
expertise to apply for grants.  Even with the 
grant-writing function supported, the level of 
funding available for grants in coming years is 
anticipated to be lower than in previous ones.54 
Finding 5 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 5a 
Insure that N11 services are available 
throughout the state. 
 
Recommendation 5b 
Formulate statewide public information 
campaigns to help consumers better understand 
911, which may include: 
• Appropriate reasons for calling 911 
• Alternative N11 numbers available 
for non-emergencies (311), social 
service referral (211), highway 
conditions (511), and other services 
  
Recommendation 5c 
Increase the severity of penalties from its 
                                                 
53
For instance, Public Law 110-246 (The Food & Energy 
Security Act of 2007) makes federal loans available to 
rural counties through the Secretary of Agriculture.  
 
54
Telephone interview with Patricia Greene, E911 Board 
manager. 
 
current misdemeanor maximum fine of $1,000 
for placing harassing or fraudulent 911 calls. 
Discussion 
Keeping 911 lines open for true emergencies is 
clearly a priority. A person in a life-threatening 
situation should reach a live person promptly 
upon calling 911.  Reducing the number of non-
emergency and harassing calls on 911 lines 
clearly is in the best interest of emergency 
response. N11 numbers have the potential to 
alleviate traffic on 911 calling lines, as it is 
estimated that 50 percent or more of the calls 
answered in call centers are not emergencies.  
Some counties, like Orange, have a fully 
operational 311 system. Others, like Alachua, 
utilize 311 during high traffic times, such as the 
aftermath of a hurricane. Funding should be 
available to support these systems, even though 
they are not technically a part of the 911 system. 
They will improve the 911 system by reducing 
call volume. 
 
However, the availability of numbers like 311 or 
211 cannot reduce the call volume if the public 
is unaware they exist.  Expansion of N11 
numbers should be accompanied by public 
information campaigns to help support them. 
 
Harassing calls are another matter.  They 
represent a significant cost for taxpayers when 
teams are sent on false alarms; they may 
contribute to the stressful environment of the 
call taker; and, most importantly, they tie up 
lines that would otherwise be open for true 
emergencies.  Deterrence along with public 
education may reduce the number of these calls. 
Higher fines, or even restitution collected from 
those found guilty, may deter others.  
Florida has yet to establish N11 service, 
which would reduce the instances of 911 
centers being overwhelmed by inappropriate 
calls.  
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Technological solutions also should be 
considered; the National Association of State 
911 Administrators (NASNA) has asked that 
regulators look into such options as call 
blocking to prevent repeat harass calls from NSI 
phones.55 
Finding 6 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 6a 
Conduct comprehensive study of equipment 
available to place 911 calls, receive 911 calls, 
dispatch emergency response and communicate 
with emergency responders in the field to detect 
interconnectivity vulnerabilities. 
 
Recommendation 6b 
Establish state-level lists of approved equipment 
or standards for interconnectivity among all 
types of devices used to access and mobilize 
emergency response. These lists will be 
consulted by E911 purchasing authorizes. 
 
Recommendation 6c 
Ensure that all users of E911 resources, such as 
                                                 
55
NASNA makes a compelling, well-researched argument 
in its Petition for a Notice of Inquiry Regarding 911 Call-
Forwarding Requirements and Carriers’ Blocking Options 
for Non-Initialized Phones,  CC Docket Number 94-102. 
Available online at 
http://www.nasna911.org/docs/Petition-Non-Initialized-
Devices.pdf. 
 
the Florida Interconnectivity Network, have 
adequate training to do so effectively. 
 
Discussion 
Many different types of specialized equipment 
is needed to activate a seamless, end-to-end 911 
system.  Since there is no centralization to 
insure that all equipment purchased can 
communicate with other equipment purchased, a 
seamless system cannot be built or maintained.  
Some equipment used by PSAPs is listed on 
individual county reports submitted to the state 
for inclusion in the overall State E911 Plan. 
However, only the equipment used to answer 
calls is noted. Equipment used for dispatch, 
unless it is integrated into call-taking 
equipment, is not listed on the plan. However, 
when one considers only the call taking 
equipment, there is a great deal of variation 
across the counties.  
 
The type of equipment used for dispatch and 
among first responders in the field is not 
reported for inclusion in the State E911 Plan.  
There is a plan for coordinating the remainder of 
the equipment used for emergency response, but 
that information is contained in another report, 
created and issued by another office.  The 
state’s plan for dispatch and first responder 
radio equipment is developed by another 
department, the Department of Management 
Services Telecommunications Division.56  
                                                 
56
That plan is available online at 
http://www.dms.myflorida.com/suncom/public_safety/rad
io_communications/radio_communication_plans. 
 
Florida's coordination of equipment used for 
emergency response remains incomplete and 
hinders seamless communication throughout 
the state. 
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It is unlikely that PSAPs will willingly 
surrender authority to select their own 
equipment and vendors. This report does not 
recommend one vendor over another nor 
advocate for removing purchasing authority 
from the counties or PSAPs.  Rather, the 
centralized authority recommended in Finding 1 
would retain records of all equipment, not just 
call-taking equipment, used by PSAPs and 
provide information about interconnectivity and 
compatibility for the equipment a PSAP might 
consider. This would give county-level 
coordinators and PSAP managers information 
about what other call centers are purchasing and 
help them evaluate various products under 
consideration. 
 
Finding 7 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendation 7a 
Conduct a comprehensive assessment of the 
state’s wireline infrastructure to determine if it 
is practically sustainable for 911 emergency 
response until newer technology supplants it. 
 
Recommendation 7b 
Continue to encourage telecommunications 
industry representatives to upgrade devices to 
enhance them with the latest available 
technology for locating 911 callers, such as 
GPS. 
 
Discussion 
Wirelines, also referred to as “legacy” lines, are 
deteriorating throughout the country. There was 
no reference available to determine whether 
Florida’s wired network is capable of carrying 
911 signals until technological alternatives 
become viable. It makes sense that Florida, 
which has seen much of its growth in the latter 
part of the last century, may be in better shape 
than others because the lines were laid more 
recently than other states. However, this 
assumption has no empirical support that this 
research team was able to access. 
 
Further, even if Florida’s wired connections are 
in reasonable shape throughout the state, new 
technology still must replace them eventually.  
Even wireline connections in the best of shape 
have limited capacity as connectors.  Newer 
telecommunications devices are capable of 
transmitting text, pictures and video.  Old lines 
can’t carry this information to the PSAPs. 
 
Nevertheless, those in the telecommunications 
industry should continue to enable upgrades for 
911 use.  Installation of GPS devices into 
wireless devices, for instance, will greatly 
enhance capable PSAPs in obtaining more 
accurate location information about wireless 
911 callers.  Upgrades in technology, like that 
which would help resolve challenges of using 
GPS to locate a single caller in a skyscraper, can 
only enhance the state’s ability to save lives.
Florida has made significant progress in 
incorporating new technology into the 911 
system, but other infrastructure vulnerabil-
ities remain unaddressed. 
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VII. Conclusion 
 
Researchers and team members originally 
approached this as a study of the 911 system to 
understand why failures happen and what might 
be done to prevent them in the future.  It became 
evident that this task was impossible because 
there is no 911 “system” in Florida.   
 
There is enhanced 911 service in the state that 
allows most callers to use the numbers 9-1-1, 
and in most cases, reach a call taker who can 
identify the caller’s location and call-back 
number.  That is the extent of E911 in Florida. 
 
There is no overall system that incorporates all 
the elements of rapid emergency response.  
There is no one person or board that ensures 
callers have access, that telecommunications 
devices and the connections they use will work 
when they call 911, and that the person who 
answers the call has the ability and desire to 
assist the caller.  There is no one person or 
board that is responsible for ensuring that 
communications equipment purchased is 
compatible with other communications 
equipment used in the state, from consumer to 
responder. .There is no one person or board that 
monitors how well Florida responded to its 14.5 
million 911 callers last year.  
 
It is evident that many isolated elements of the 
911 emergency response work.  But, as noted in 
the discussion, if one element works and another 
fails during the emergency response sequence, 
the chain of communication is broken and the 
system fails that caller. 
Because the system lacks any overarching 
central oversight, there are multiple points 
where gaps in the system may result in failure. 
Continued funding of new technology, training 
and procedures through the entire sequence of 
call-to-response is a necessity to reduce the 
opportunities for both technological and human 
error.  Centralization under one board or person 
would increase the coordination and 
accountability of the system.  Consolidation of 
call taking and dispatch functions would reduce 
transfers, and thus chances for errors, and 
reduce costs by eliminating duplicated services. 
 
A state with 53 million square miles of land 
mass, 18 million residents and 84 million 
visitors cannot afford to have a loosely 
coordinated 911 emergency response system. As 
one 911 expert noted, “When 911 calls fall 
apart, bad things happen.”57  Lives are lost.
                                                 
57
Remarks by consultant Mike Williams, quoted in Jonsson, 
Patrick (2008 Sept. 11). “Delays, mistakes plague 911 
system,” Christian Science Monitor, p. 3. 
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APPENDIX A: Interview List 
The research team conducted numerous formal and informal interviews with individuals who deal with 
various aspects of 911, from those who design the policy and technology to those who use or are 
affected by it.  Interviews were conducted in person, over the telephone, via e-mail and during a round-
table discussion. The insights of those herein listed enhanced the researchers’ understanding of the 
various components activated during emergency response. Their appearance on this list in no way 
implies support for this report or any of its recommendations. 
State Senator Steve Oelrich (former Sheriff of Alachua County) 
Emergency Services Consultant Randy Kerr 
E911 Board Manager Patricia Green 
E911 System Coordinator Wink Infinger 
Florida Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials President Susan Pettingill 
Denise Amber Lee Foundation President Mark Lee (also father-in-law of  Denise Amber Lee) 
National Emergency Number Association Technical Director Roger Hixon 
High Springs City Attorney Tom DePeter 
Liberty County 911 Coordinator Stephen Ford 
 
From Alachua County: 
County Commissioner Lee Pinkoson 
Homeland Security Agent Frank Stegl 
Gainesville Fire Rescue Fire Chief Bill Northcutt  
Combined Communications Center Division Manager Linda Jones 
911 Coordinator Susan Nelson  
Bureau Chief, Communications Operations Bureau, Pat Ford Thomas 
Financial Bureau Chief Patty Justice 
Communications Commander, Communications Operations Bureau, Sylvia Armstong 
Communications Commander, Communications Operations Bureau, Ryan Lee 
Executive Officer, Technical Services Division (Alachua County), Sammie Cooper 
Gainesville Police Department Lt. Wayne Ash 
Former Combined Communications Center call taker who wished to remain anonymous 
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APPENDIX B: 911 Call Taker Training Requirements 
State Hours  State Hours 
Nevada 480  Montana 40 
District of 
Columbia 
360  New York 40 
Louisiana 320  Ohio 40 
Virginia 280  Texas 40 
Florida 208  West Virginia 40 
Kentucky 160  Massachusetts 32 
California 120  Utah 24 
New Mexico 120  Missouri 16/40 
Pennsylvania 104  Alabama 0 
New Jersey 90  Alaska 0 
Arizona 80  Arkansas 0 
Connecticut 80  Colorado 0 
Oregon 80  Idaho 0 
South Carolina 80  Illinois 0 
South Dakota 80  Indiana 0 
Tennessee 80  Kansas 0 
Washington 80  Michigan 0 
Georgia 64  Nebraska 0 
Wyoming 58  New Hampshire 0 
Maine 56  North Carolina 0 
Iowa 40  Oklahoma 0 
Maryland 40  Vermont 0 
Minnesota 40  Wisconsin 0 
Mississippi 40    
 
Source: National Emergency Number Association 
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APPENDIX C: E911 Trust Fund Requirements, F.S. 365.172  
Expenses that may be submitted by counties to E911 Board for reimbursement, as specified in Florida 
Statutes: 
• Call Answering Equipment  
• Call Transferring Equipment  
• ANI Controllers 
• ALI Controllers  
• ANI Displays  
• ALI Displays 
• Station Instruments  
• E911 Telecommunications Systems  
• Visual Call Information and Storage Devices 
• Recording Equipment  
• Devices for Hearing Impaired  
• PSAP Backup Power Systems 
• Consoles 
• Automatic Call Distributors and Interfaces 
o Integrated Computer-Aided Dispatch Systems for that portion of the systems used for E911 
call taking 
• Network Clocks 
o Salary and Associated Expenses for E911 Call Takers for that portion of their time spent 
taking and transferring E911 calls 
o Salary and Associated expenses for a county to employ a full-time equivalent E911 
Coordinator Position 
• Full time Equivalent Mapping or Geographical Data Position 
o Staff Assistant Position for the portion of their time spent administering E911 system 
• Training Costs for Call Takers, Supervisors and Managers 
• Next Generation E911 database services 
• Next Generation E911 Equipment  
• Next Generation E911 Routing System 
 
Expenses expressly denied reimbursement: 
• Capital and operating costs after the call is transferred to the responding agency 
• Building construction, maintenance or lease
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APPENDIX D: A History of 911 and Federal Policy 
Though legislation formally designating 911 as the national emergency response number was not passed until 
1999, the federal government has been involved in promoting a universal number for more than 40 years. 
A law enforcement commission in the Johnson Administration recommended a national emergency number 
in1967.58 AT&T designated 911 as its national emergency number in January 1968, but the Alabama 
Telephone Co. launched 911 first, in February.  Twelve years later, in Orange County, Fla., AT&T tested the 
first modern Enhanced 911 system, with automatic number identification and location identification. 
During that time, the federal government provided financial support to local efforts to improve emergency 
response via 911.  However, changes at the federal level from categorical grants to block grant funding in the 
1980s reduced financial support and coordination of  emergency response systems. 
Since then, the push to develop more organized systems of EMS delivery has diminished, and EMS systems 
have been left to develop haphazardly across the United States. There is now enormous variability in the 
design of EMS systems among states and local areas.59 
Finally, in 1999, when it became clear that developing technology would transform emergency response, the 
federal government took the lead and passed the Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act. 
 The Act  notes that an “end-to-end” system of "seamless, ubiquitous, and reliable networks ” would “save 
thousands of lives and billions of dollars in health care costs.” Explicit in the language is a call for statewide 
coordination of efforts and equipment among emergency service providers, establishment of a stable and 
adequate funding mechanism, inclusion of rural residents, and rapid deployment of emerging technologies.60  
The Enhance 911 Act of 2004 directed states to upgrade technology such that 911 calls made from 
cellular phones carried the same information as those placed from wirelines. In 2008, Congress 
passed the New and Emerging Technologies 911 Improvement Act to include new internet-based 
devices.  
                                                 
58
See, for example, History of 911, www.911dispatch.com/911/history. 
 
59
Committee on the Future of Emergency Care in the United States Health System (2007). Emergency Medical Services at a 
Crossroads. Washington D.C.: National Academies Press. 
 
60
Senate Bill 800 became Public Law 106-81 in October, 1999. The bill also amended the Communications Act of 1934 to 
designate 911 as the universal emergency 
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APPENDIX E: Florida E911 Features by County 
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Compiled from U.S. Census data and County E911 Reports submitted to the Florida Department of Management Services 
(www.dms.myflorida.com) 
 
 
